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THE HATFIELD RIDERS & ENVIRONMENTAL 
PRESERVATION: WHAT PROCESS IS DUE? 
Kathleen M. Vanderziel* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the current rate of consumption, the unprotected old-growth 
forests of Oregon and Washington will disappear by the year 2023,1 
despite the growing concern for environmental conservation. 2 The 
United States Forest Service (USFS) defines old-growth forests as 
forests of trees that are roughly 200 or more years old.3 In Oregon 
and Washington, about 2.4 million acres of old-growth remains, less 
than one-eighth of the original forest.4 These old-growth forests, 
already the last of their kind, serve many important functions, such 
as forestalling global warming, providing an indispensable source for 
medicinal plants, and offering a habitat for such endangered species 
as the spotted owl. 5 
Unfortunately, old-growth forests also provide significant income 
to areas that have become dependent upon the logging industry. 6 
These economic interests are the primary force behind many of the 
current state and local policies that promote the use and consumption 
• Articles Editor, 1991-1992, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
I Elliot A. Norse, What Good Are Ancient Forests?, 41 AMICUS J. 42, 42 (1990). 
2 See CAROL S. HUNTING & VICTOR M. SHER, ERODING THE LANDSCAPE, ERODING THE 
LAWS: CONGRESSIONAL EXEMPTIONS FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION LAWS 67 (to be published in HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.) [hereinafter ERODING]. According 
to Hunting and Sher, a recent poll shows that over the past ten years, the number of people 
who feel that protecting the environment is so important that the governing standards and 
requirements can not be too high has increased dramatically. See id. 
S Jim Stiak, Old Growth!, 41 AMICUS J. 35, 35 (1990). 
4 Id. 
S See Norse, supra note 1, at 42. 
6 See id. 
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of the old-growth forests. 7 In recent years, environmental groups 
have attempted to limit the consumption of old-growth forests 
through the judicial system. 8 
These public interest groups, invoking the protection of federal 
environmental legislation,9 have relied on the courts to ensure the 
balancing of environmental and economic concerns in governmental 
decisionmaking regarding the old-growth forests. 1o One of the stat-
utes that has become a key weapon in these judicial battles is the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).n Under NEPA, all 
governmental agencies must file an environmental impact statement 
(EIS) prior to the implementation of any major federal action. 12 
Congress implemented the EIS requirement to ensure that federal 
agencies consider the environmental impacts of their activities. 13 
Environmental groups concerned with the current consumption of 
federally owned old-growth timber have brought agencies like the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the USFS into court in an 
attemptto enforce NEPA's EIS requirement. 14 
The trend towards judicial involvement in environmental planning 
and decisionmaking has not gone unnoticed. Since 1985, Senator 
7 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice 
Douglas characterized federal agencies as being "notoriously under the control of powerful 
interests who manipulate them through advisory committees, or friendly working relations." 
[d. at 745. The agencies involved in forest management are no different. 
8 See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1312 (9th Cir. 1990), eert. 
granted, III S. Ct. 2886 (1991); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 895 F.2d 627, 
628 (9th Cir.), eert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2621 (1990); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 
1233, 1234 (9th Cir.), eert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470 (1989). 
9 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988); Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1783 (1988); National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988). 
10 See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1312 (9th Cir. 1990), eert. 
granted, III S. Ct. 2886 (1991); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 895 F.2d 627, 
628 (9th Cir.), eert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2621 (1990); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 
1233, 1234 (9th Cir.), eert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470 (1989); see also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating 
Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (NEPA 
mandates balancing of economic, technical, and environmental considerations in agency deci-
sionmaking that may have an impact on the environment). 
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988). 
12 [d. § 4332(C). 
18 See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 
F.2d 1109, 1117-18 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
14 See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233, 1234 (9th Cir.), eert. denied, 
110 S. Ct. 1470 (1989); City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 750 F. Supp. 1406, 1412-13 (D. 
Alaska), rev'd on other grounds, 915 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1990); National Wildlife Fed'n v. 
United States Forest Serv., 643 F. Supp. 653,653 (D. Or. 1984), modified, SOl F.2d 360 (9th 
Cir. 1986). 
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Mark O. Hatfield of Oregon has sponsored amendments or "riders" 
to appropriations bills15 that effectively have denied environmental 
groups access to the courts, leaving agencies free to disregard en-
vironmental concerns during the formulation of their plans and pol-
icies. 16 Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson,17 which the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently decided, may 
provide some reprieve from Senator Hatfield's riders.18 In Seattle 
Audubon, the court found that Congress's use of appropriations bills 
to deny judicial review was a violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine, because the denial amounted to legislating a judicial con-
clusion rather than positive law. 19 
This Comment will show the limited value of the Ninth Circuit's 
opinion in Seattle Audubon20 and pose a possible solution to the 
persistent governmental encroachment on important environmental 
resources. Section II of this Comment briefly describes the Hatfield 
riders, their scope, and the nature of appropriations bills. The gen-
eral power of Congress to deny judicial review of federal agency 
activity is explored in section III. Section IV discusses judicial at-
tempts to limit this congressional power and determines that due 
process provides the strongest protection from agency overreaching. 
Section V of this Comment examines NEPA's underlying policy and 
procedural requirements. Section VI sets out five broad conclusions: 
that the courts play an indispensable role in environmental decision-
making; that the Hatfield riders cannot express true congressional 
intent because of the nature and purpose of appropriations bills; that 
under current judicial policies, courts can overrule the Hatfield ri-
ders as a violation of the congressional rules of procedure; and that 
the United States Constitution affords the best protection to the 
public's concern for the environment. Finally, this Comment con-
cludes that NEP A creates an entitlement to environmental preser-
vation sufficient to garner due process protection. 
16 See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
16 See Linda M. Bolduan, Comment, The Hatfield Riders: Eliminating the Role of the 
Courts in Environmental Decision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 329, 332 (1990). Senator Hatfield 
is the senior Senator from the state of Oregon and wields much influence over the issues that 
directly affect his state and its economy. Id. at 371. Senator Hatfield's interest in the old-
growth timber harvest is due to the timber industry's large impact on Oregon's economy. See 
id. at 362. 
17 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990). 
18 See id. at 1317. 
19 See id. at 1316-17. 
00 See infra note 188-92 and accompanying text. 
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II. SENATOR HATFIELD'S RIDERS 
A. The Riders and Their Scope 
In 1985, Senator Hatfield attached a rider to a supplemental ap-
propriations bill. 21 The appropriations bill authorized the USFS to 
resell certain timber in the Mapelton Ranger District of the Suislaw 
National Forest, a national forest comprised of many old-growth 
stands.22 The rider also stated that the Secretary of Agriculture's 
decisions regarding these sales would not be subject to judicial re-
view.23 This rider effectively circumvented a court-ordered injunc-
tion issued just six months earlier that prohibited such a sale prior 
to the USFS's filing of an EIS under NEPA.24 The 1985 rider was 
the first of nine such riders that Senator Hatfield introduced to limit 
or deny judicial review of federal forest management decisions in 
the Oregon and Washington old-growth forests. 25 
21 Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-88, 
99 Stat. 293, 340 (1985). 
22 Jd.; see also Bolduan, supra note 16, at 335. 
23 Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-88, 
99 Stat. 293, 340 (1985). 
24 Jd.; see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 643 F. Supp. 653, 
653 (D. Or. 1984) (amending original judgment), rrwdified, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986). In 
National Wildlife Federation, the court enjoined the USFS from selling or offering to sell 
any timber in the Mapleton Ranger District prior to its filing an EIS for the Mapleton Seven 
Year Action Plan for fiscal years 1983 through 1989. 643 F. Supp. at 653. The district court 
offered to let the USFS prepare individual environmental assessments for each sale as an 
alternative to a comprehensive EIS. See id. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit rejected the latter alternative, thus prohibiting all timber sales prior to 
the completion of a comprehensive EIS. See National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest 
Serv., 801 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1986). 
26 See Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-190, 99 Stat. 
1185, 1226-27 (1985) (denied review of BLM's Medford District timber sales); Continuing 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-268 (1986) 
(predecessor to § 314); Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 
§ 314, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-254 (1987), reprinted in 133 CONGo REC. H12,468 (1987) (continued 
rider from previous fiscal year that denied judicial review when USFS and BLM plans were 
challenged for failure to take into account new information regarding environmental damage); 
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. 
L. No. 100-446, § 321, 102 Stat. 1774, 1827 (1988) (denied judicial review of all NEPA and 
National Forest Management Act claims for fiscal year 1989 timber sales in Mapleton Ranger 
District); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1989, 
Pub. L. No. 100-446, § 320, 102 Stat. 1774, 1826-27 (1988) (denied review of Silver-Complex 
Fire Recovery Project in Siskiyou National Forest final EIS); Department of the Interior and 
Related Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-446, § 314, 102 Stat. 
1774, 1825-26 (1988) (continued riders from fiscal years 1987 and 1988); Department of the 
Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, 
§ 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989) (denied review of timber management plan as set out in 
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Senator Hatfield intended the nine riders to prevent the disruption 
of Oregon's economy by environmental groups. According to Senator 
Hatfield, these groups have been abusing the appeals process in 
order to delay the implementation of USFS and BLM forest man-
agement policies.26 Senator Hatfield described the riders as short-
term measures to "facilitate" what he views as legitimate forest 
management. 27 Despite Senator Hatfield's assurances, however, 
these riders have not been short-term measures.28 For example, one 
of the riders, which denied judicial review of any existing USFS or 
BLM plan solely on the basis that these plans do not incorporate 
new information regarding possible environmental impacts, was 
originally an amendment to an appropriations bill for the fiscal year 
1987.29 This rider, with only slight modifications, has been appended 
to three subsequent appropriations bills. 30 Thus, the USFS and the 
BLM have been able to continue their present forest policy for four 
years notwithstanding the existence of new information that reveals 
the detrimental effect of planned and subsequently implemented 
logging policies on the spotted owl populations in Oregon.31 
Not only do Senator Hatfield's riders have more than a short-term 
effect on the management of old-growth forests in Oregon, but they 
may have an effect on forest management in other parts of the 
country.32 In City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough,33 the USFS at-
§ 318(b)(5) and § 318(b)(6»; Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations 
Act for Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 312, 103 Stat. 701, 743 (1989) (reenacting 
§ 314 without modification). 
26 See Bolduan, supra note 16, at 371. 
27 See 136 CONGo REC. S8369, S8369 (daily ed. June 20, 1990); see also Bolduan, supra note 
16, at 362. 
28 See Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341, 
3341-268 (1986) (predecessor to § 314); Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. 
L. No. 100-202, § 314, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-254 (1987), reprinted in 133 CONGo REC. H12,468 
(continuing rider from previous fiscal year); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-446, § 314, 102 Stat. 1774, 1825-26 (1988) 
(continuing riders from fiscal years 1987 and 1988); Department of the Interior and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 312, 103 Stat. 701, 
743 (1989) (reenacting without modification § 314 from previous fiscal year). 
29 See Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341, 
3341-268 (1986) (predecessor to § 314). 
30 See supra note 28. 
31 See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1470-71 (D. Or. 1989). 
32 See City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 750 F. Supp. 1406, 1415 (D. Alaska 1990). 
33 750 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Alaska 1990). The United States District Court for the District of 
Alaska held that the appropriation legislation at issue did not bar claims that the USFS should 
have adopted a stream buffer, however, the court refused to issue a preliminary injunction to 
halt planned timber sales until the claim could be adjudicated. Id. at 1430. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court's decision not 
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tempted to use section 312 of the Interior Appropriations Act of 
198934-the most recent version of Senator Hatfield's 1987 rider 
denying review of existing USFS or BLM plans because they do not 
incorporate new information35-to bar the plaintiffs' claim that the 
USFS's Tongass Land Management plan violated NEP A.36 The 
plaintiffs claimed that the violation occurred when the USFS re-
jected a proposed policy that would have required a 100-foot uncut 
buffer strip along certain streams. 37 The United States District 
Court for the District of Alaska found that the plaintiffs' claim fell 
under an exception delineated in the rider, thus implicitly finding 
section 312 applicable to the situation at hand. 38 As a result, Senator 
Hatfield's rider, which dealt with the sale of old-growth timber in 
Oregon and Washington, became potentially applicable to timber 
sales in Alaska's national forests. 39 If other courts follow the Tenakee 
Springs court, Senator Hatfield's riders may prohibit judicial review 
of a wide range of federal agency activities affecting the environ-
ment, not just those occurring in the old-growth forests of Oregon 
and Washington. 
B. The Riders, Appropriations Bills, and Congressional 
Procedure 
Senator Hatfield's riders in effect have exempted agencies such as 
the BLM and the USFS from fulfilling certain statutory require-
ments. 40 For instance, section 312 exempted the USFS from having 
to complete a supplemental EIS for its long-term management plan 
for the old-growth forests in the Mapelton Ranger District of Ore-
to issue a preliminary injunction. City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915 F.2d 1308, 1314 (9th 
Cir. 1990). The appellate court held that a narrowly tailored injunction pending the appeal of 
the logging permit was necessary, as the environmental consequences of the proposed action 
would be irreversible in the foreseeable future. Id. 
34 Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 312, 103 Stat. 701, 743 (1989). 
35 Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341, 
3341-268 (1986). 
36 Terwkee Springs, 750 F. Supp. at 1413. 
37 Id. 
38 See id. at 1415. The rider denies judicial review of existing plans providing that there 
shall be judicial review of particular activities carried out under existing plans. See Continuing 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 312, 103 Stat. 701, 743 (1989). 
39 See Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 314, 101 
Stat. 1329, 1329-254 (1987), reprinted in 133 CONGo REc. H12,468 (1989); cf. Portland Audubon 
Soc'y V. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1989) (court noted that lawsuit before them was 
the particular lawsuit that the drafters of § 314 intended to prevent). 
40 See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1485, 1489 (D. Or. 1989). 
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gon.41 The supplemental EIS, which the Assistant Secretary of Ag-
riculture had ordered, was to consider significant new information 
regarding the threat of the planned old-growth harvest on the spot-
ted owl population. 42 The BLM's refusal to draft the supplemental 
EIS, a decision sanctioned by section 312, disregarded NEPA's re-
quirement that new information regarding the effects of a major 
federal action on the environment be incorporated in a supplemental 
EIS.43 
Congress has accomplished these statutory exemptions through 
legislation the sole purpose of which should be to appropriate reve-
nue for the support of the federal government. 44 Appropriations bills 
are designed to implement substantive legislation by appropriating 
the funds necessary for the operation of government agencies whose 
mandate is to implement that legislation-the bills are not intended 
to create substantive legislation. 45 Both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate have restricted the possible contents of appro-
priations bills because of the bills' limited purpose.46 Each house 
prohibits the inclusion of any new or general legislation in appropri-
ations bills. 47 
Due to the limited content of appropriations bills, they pass 
through a less restrictive and less thorough legislative process than 
substantive legislation. 48 The House and Senate are composed of 
41 See Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 312, 103 
Stat. 701, 743 (1989); see also National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 643 F. 
Supp. 653, 653 (D. Or. 1984), modified, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1986). 
42 Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210, 21,211 (D. 
Or. 1988) (Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Douglas MacCleery), rev'd, 866 F.2d 302 (9th 
Cir. 1989). The Oregon state director of the BLM later decided not to supplement the original 
EIS, because he considered the new information not to be significant. ld. 
43 See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 109 S. Ct. 1851, 1859 (1989). Despite 
this duty, the Supreme Court concluded that unless an agency's decision not to supplement 
an EIS was arbitrary and capricious, it could not be set aside. ld. The United States District 
Court for the District of Oregon, however, found that the BLM director's decision not to 
supplement the EIS with the new information concerning the spotted owl was arbitrary and 
capricious. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. at 1485. 
44 See Senate Rules, in SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., SENATE MANUAL CONTAIN-
ING STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No.1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, Rule XVI(2) (1984) 
[hereinafter SENATE RULES]. 
46 See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, Rule X 
(revised ed., Feb. 1, 1990) [hereinafter HOUSE RULES]. 
46 SENATE RULES, supra note 44, at 14, Rule XVI(2); HOUSE RULES, supra note 45, at 
25, Rule XXI. 
47 SENATE RULES, supra note 44, at 14, Rule XVI(2); HOUSE RULES, supra note 45, at 
25, Rule XXI. 
48 See SENATE RULES, supra note 44, at 48-58, Rule XXVI; HOUSE RULES, supra note 
45, at 20, Rule XXI. 
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committees that review, debate, and vote on legislation before it 
comes before the full houses for a final vote. 49 Whenever a proposed 
bill will affect an area within a particular committee's purview, that 
legislation must pass the committee's review process. 50 For example, 
both the Committee on Agriculture and the Committee on the Ju-
diciary in the House of Representatives have jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of Senator Hatfield's riders. 51 These committees, 
however, did not review the rider or the appropriations bill to which 
it was attached52 because, traditionally, committees other than the 
Committee on Appropriations do not review appropriations bills. 53 
The review process of the Committee on Appropriations is distin-
guishable from that of the other committees. Under the standing 
rules of the Senate, each committee except for the Committee on 
Appropriations must fix regular meeting days on which to transact 
business. 54 When standing committees hold hearings regarding pro-
posed legislation, they are required to make public announcements 
regarding the time, place, and subject matter of any hearing to be 
conducted. 55 Whenever such a hearing takes place, the committee 
minority may call witnesses to testify regarding the legislation in 
debate. 56 In addition, each committee must keep a complete record 
of all its actions, a record that includes the disposition of all members 
during a vote within the committee. 57 The Committee on Appropri-
ations is the only committee exempted from all of these require-
ments. 58 The Committee on Appropriations also is exempted from 
the requirement that a report discussing costs and regulatory im-
pacts accompany each of its bills. 59 By exempting the Committee on 
Appropriations from the traditional standing committee require-
ments, Congress is reinforcing not only the committee's special func-
tion but also the special and limited character of its legislation. 60 
49 See SENATE RULES, supra note 44, at 24-48, Rule XXV; HOUSE RULES, supra note 45, 
at 20, Rule X. 
50 See HOUSE RULES, supra note 45, at 20, Rule X. 
51 See ERODING, supra note 2, at 57; see also HOUSE RULES, supra note 45, at 3, 5, 
Rule X. 
62 See id.; Bolduan, supra note 16, at 371. 
63 See ERODING, supra note 2, at 57. 
54 SENATE RULES, supra note 44, at 48-49, Rule XXVI. 
55 See id. Rule XXVI(1), (4). Committees can abrogate this requirement upon a showing 
that the subject matter of the hearing is of a sensitive nature, involving a topic such as national 
security. Id. 
66 Id. at 50, Rule XXVI(4)(d). 
57 See id. at 53, Rule XXVI(7)(b). 
68 See id. at 48-58, Rule XXVI. 
59 Id. at 56-57, Rule XXVI(ll)(a}-(b). 
60 See id. 
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The courts, too, have recognized the special nature of appropria-
tions bills, particularly when interpreting such bills in order to dis-
cern congressional intent. 61 In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,62 
the Supreme Court stated not only that congressional intent to 
repeal a law must be "clear and manifest," but also that, when the 
subsequent legislation proposing to repeal a law is an appropriations 
bill, the clear and manifest requirement applies with even greater 
vigor. 63 In Tennessee Valley, the plaintiffs claimed that the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 required the Court to enjoin the 
completion of the nearly finished Tellico dam.64 In 1973, six years 
after construction on the dam had begun, a previously unknown 
species of perch, the snail darter, was discovered in the waters of 
the Little Tennessee River, the river on which the dam was being 
built. 65 In October 1975, the Secretary of the Interior listed the snail 
darter as an endangered species pursuant to the Act.66 Furthermore, 
the Secretary determined that the completion of the dam would 
destroy the snail darter's habitat, which consisted of a small portion 
of the Little Tennessee River. 67 
The Tennessee Valley Authority's (TVA's) primary defense to the 
suit was that an appropriations bill enacted in 1977 had repealed 
ESA as it applied to the Tellico dam. 68 In the bill, the Committee on 
Appropriations not only had appropriated funds for the completion 
of the dam, but also had stated that, in the committee's view, the 
Act did not prohibit the project's completion, particularly at such an 
advanced stage. 69 In rejecting the TVA's argument, the Court con-
cluded that the views expressed in the bill were those of the indi-
vidual members of the Committee and not of Congress as a whole. 70 
Therefore, under the Court's analysis, the bill did not repeal or 
modify the congressional intent expressed in the ESA that no fed-
61 See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978); Portland Audubon 
Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302,305-06 (9th Cir. 1989). But cf. Oregon Natural Resources Council 
v. Mohla, 895 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir.) (appropriations bill represented congressional intent 
sufficient to bar plaintiffs' suit), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3621 (1990); Portland Audubon Soc'y 
v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir.) (appropriations bill represents explicit congressional 
command precluding judicial review), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470 (1989). 
62 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
63 [d. at 190. 
M [d. at 156. 
65 [d. at 158-59. 
66 [d. at 161. 
67 [d. at 161-62. 
68 [d. at 189. 
69 [d. at 167. 
70 [d. at 193. 
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erally funded project jeopardize the continued existence of a spe-
cies.71 
The Court reasoned in Tennessee Valley that, because the purpose 
of an appropriations measure is limited to providing funds for au-
thorized programs, legislators were entitled to believe that the funds 
would be devoted to lawful purposes. 72 Without such an assurance, 
they would have to examine exhaustively the underlying authoriza-
tion of every appropriation before voting on it: a situation that 
Congress adopted its procedural rules to avoid. 73 The Court also 
noted that expressions of committee members regarding requests 
for appropriations could not be equated with congressionally enacted 
statutes, although both are technically acts of Congress. 74 The Court 
gave two reasons for this distinction: first, the Committee on Ap-
propriations had no jurisdiction over the subject matter with which 
it had dealt, namely, over endangered species; and second, there 
was no evidence that Congress as a whole was aware of the few 
isolated comments that members of the Committee on Appropria-
tions had made. 75 
In a case decided just a year later, Sierra Club v. Andrus,76 the 
Supreme Court had to determine whether NEPA required federal 
agencies to prepare an EIS for an appropriations request. 77 The 
Court, maintaining its distinction between statutes and appropria-
tions requests, held that appropriations requests were not proposals 
for legislation and thus did not fall under the NEPA requirement. 78 
According to the Court, maintaining this distinction assured that 
Congress considered financial matters independently of the efficacy 
of certain governmental programs. 79 The Court concluded that the 
distinction allowed the Committee on Appropriations to concentrate 
on financial matters and prevented it from "trespassing" on substan-
tive legislation.80 
In both Tennessee Valley and Andrus, the Court did not find the 
appropriations bills invalid because they violated congressional rules, 
71 Id. at 173, 193. 
72 Id. at 190. 
73 Id.; see also SENATE RULES, supra note 44, at 14, Rule XVI(2); HOUSE RULES, supra 
note 45, at 25, Rule XXI. 
74 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 191 (1978). 
75 Id. at 191-92. 
76 Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 
77 Id. at 348-49. 
78 Id. at 359-6l. 
79 Id. at 36l. 
BO Id. 
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but rather because they had limited application as substantive leg-
islation. 81 A court, however, can determine the validity of an act of 
Congress in light of either the Senate or House rules of procedure. 82 
In United States v. Ballin,83 the Supreme Court established its 
power to review congressional rules of procedure.84 While acknowl-
edging that the Constitution grants each house the sole power to 
establish its own rules of procedure, 85 the Court noted its jurisdiction 
to determine the constitutionality of these rules and the reasonable-
ness of each rule in relation to the result sought.86 In Ballin, the 
plaintiff challenged a bill dealing with the classification of cloth 
goods. 87 The Court, after reviewing the validity of the procedural 
rule involved in the bill's passage, determined the bill to be valid. 88 
In later cases, the Court found an act of Congress to be invalid 
due to the legislature's failure to obey its own rules of procedure. 89 
In Christoffel v. United States,90 the appellant was indicted for lying 
under oath at a hearing before the House Committee on Education 
and Labor. 91 The appellant presented evidence at trial indicating 
that, at the time he made his perjurious statements, less than a full 
quorum of the committee was in attendance: a violation of House 
rules. 92 While the Court claimed no power to determine what rules 
of procedure Congress could establish, it did reserve the right to 
review the rules Congress had established and to determine whether 
they had been followed. 93 The Court concluded that the indictment 
was invalid unless the jury was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that a majority of the committee was actually present to hear the 
statements. 94 Thus, the indictment of the appellant would be invalid 
81 See Andrus, 442 U.S. at 359-61; Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190-92 
(1978). 
82 See, e.g., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 121 (1963); Christoffel v. United States, 
338 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1949); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892). 
83 144 U.S. 1 (1892). 
84 Id. at 5. 
86 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 provides that "Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings, .... " 
86 Ballin, 144 U.S. at 5. 
87 Id. at 10. 
BS Id. at 5-9. 
89 See, e.g., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 121 (1963); Christoffel v. United States, 
338 U.S. 84 (1949). 
90 338 U.S. 84 (1949). 
91 Id. at 85. 
92 Id. at 86. 
9S Id. 
94 Id. at 89. 
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if the committee conducted the hearing on which it was based in 
violation of House rules. 96 Similarly, in Yellin v. United States,96 an 
appellant, who had been indicted for refusing to answer questions 
that a House subcommittee had put to him, claimed that his refusal 
was excusable on the grounds that the House Committee on U n-
American Activities had failed to comply with its own rules of pro-
cedure. 97 The Court overturned the committee's contempt of Con-
gress charges because of the committee's failure to obey its own 
rules. 98 
The Ballin, Christoffel, and Yellin decisions indicate that the 
courts have broad power to review and enforce congressional rules 
of procedure.99 One court further has posited that, although the 
Constitution has authorized Congress to create its own rules of 
procedure, this authorization of power is no different than other 
enumerated powers. 100 For this reason, the courts should treat rules 
of congressional procedure only with the deference customarily 
shown to other legislative enactments. lOl 
Despite their acknowledged power to review congressional rules 
of procedure, courts nevertheless have imposed limitations on the 
extent to which they will review congressional procedure. 102 For 
instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, under its own remedial discretion, has declined to hear 
cases that members of Congress have brought involving charges that 
Congress has authorized unconstitutional procedures. lO3 In Vander 
Jagt v. O'Neill,104 fourteen Republican members of the House of 
Representatives brought a suit alleging that the Democratic mem-
bers of the House systematically had discriminated against them by 
providing them with fewer committee seats than they proportion-
ately were owed. lO6 The plaintiffs claimed that the Democrats' ac-
tions in allocating committee seats violated their Fifth Amendment 
95 [d. 
96 374 U.S. 109 (1963). 
97 [d. at 110. 
98 [d. at 121, 123. 
99 Yellin, 374 U.S. at 121; see also VanderJagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166,1173 (D.C. Cir.), 
em. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). 
100 [d. 
101 [d. 
102 See, e.g., Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 544-46 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Vander Jagt, 699 
F.2d at 1175-76. 
103 See, e.g., Gregg, 771 F.2d at 544-46; Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1173-75. 
104 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
105 [d. at 1167. 
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and equal protection rights as well as their First Amendment right 
to association. 106 The court decided not to adjudicate the controversy 
on equitable grounds,107 reasoning that it would not be wise to in-
terfere with the House's method of allocating committee seats. 108 
According to the court, it would be meddling with the legislative 
process and raising separation of powers concerns. 109 The court con-
cluded that it should move cautiously in this highly political area. 110 
In Gregg v. Barrett,111 under similar facts, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia again refused, under its 
discretionary powers, to resolve a controversy between members of 
Congress. 112 The court emphasized that the congressional appellants 
could remedy their grievances through the legislative process. 113 The 
court declined, however, to dismiss several private parties' claims 
under its discretionary powers.114 The private suits provided a con-
text less laden with separation of powers concerns. 115 
In sum, courts are not likely to adjudicate a suit between members 
of Congress for fear that such an act would be too great an intrusion 
on the legislative and political processes. 116 The courts have placed 
no such limit, however, on private parties' suits to enforce a right 
against Congress.117 Because the Hatfield riders never have been 
challenged on the grounds that Congress passed them in violation of 
its rules of procedure, their denial of judicial review still stands as 
a valid act of Congress. 118 The feasibility of such a challenge will be 
explored later in this Comment, as will the question of whether the 
Hatfield riders represent true congressional intent. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1175. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
III 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
112 Id. at 545-46. In Gregg, several members of Congress, together with some private 
citizens, brought a suit alleging that the Congressional Record was inaccurately prepared and, 
as such, violated their First Amendment rights. Id. at 540. 
118 Gregg, 771 F.2d at 545. The court recited two ways in which the congressional appellants 
could achieve their ends through the legislative process: first, they could monitor the Congres-
sional Record for inaccuracies and request that the mistakes be stricken; and second, they 
could convince their fellow members of Congress to adopt a rule of verbatim accuracy. Id. 
114 I d. at 546. 
115 Id. The court dismissed the private appellants complaint on the grounds that there is 
not a First Amendment right to a verbatim transcript of congressional proceedings. Id. 
116 See Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
117 See Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
118 See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir. 1989); City of 
Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 750 F.Supp. 1406, 1415 (D. Alaska 1990). 
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III. COURTS, CONGRESS AND THE PRECLUSION OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
A. Congress's Power to Preclude Judicial Review: The Courts 
In several cases, the Supreme Court has held that Congress may 
deny judicial review of administrative agency activities. 119 This con-
clusion flows naturally from Congress's constitutionally mandated 
power to create inferior federal courts and prescribe their jurisdic-
tion. 120 In many instances, judicial deference to expert administra-
tive knowledge and experience is preferable to the confusion that 
might result from inconsistent federal court decisions. 121 
B. Congress's Power to Preclude Judicial Review: The 
Administrative Procedures Act 
The Administrative Procedures Act, (APA)122 while establishing 
the terms for judicial review of administrative activities, also codifies 
the congressional power to limit or deny such review. 123 Under AP A 
section 702, a person suffering a legal wrong as the result of agency 
action is entitled to judicial review of that action. 124 Section 706 
delineates the scope of this review, providing that courts shall set 
aside any agency action found to be, inter alia, arbitrary and capri-
cious or contrary to a provision of the Constitution. 125 Unless a 
discrete piece of legislation contains further explicit restrictions, 
AP A establishes the right to and the extent of judicial review. 126 For 
instance, APA section 701 states that these provisions cease to apply 
119 See, e.g., Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 412-14 (1977) (statutory preclusion of judicial 
review justified under § 5 of Fourteenth Amendment); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 
U.S. 301, 324-28 (1966) (statutory preclusion of judicial review was justified under § 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment). 
120 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433 (1944). Article III of the Constitution 
provides that the "judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, 
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 1. 
121 See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 433; see also Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974) 
(Administrator of Veterans Administration expressed concern that all aspects of benefit de-
terminations would be questioned if judicial review was not precluded); Reardon v. United 
States, 731 F. Supp. 558, 567 (D. Mass. 1990) (CERCLA scheme and purpose would be 
disrupted if judicial review of response actions prior to their commencement were allowed), 
rev'd, 922 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1990), op. withdrawn and vacated, 922 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1990). 
122 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). 
123 [d. § 701(a). 
124 [d. § 702. 
125 [d. § 706. 
126 [d. §§ 701-706. 
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to the extent that agency action is committed to agency discretion 
or to the extent that the statute precludes judicial review. 127 There-
fore, although APA presumes the general reviewability of agency 
activity, it also acknowledges the power of Congress to remove 
judicial review. 
In essence, APA limits to some extent the areas in which courts 
may impose their judgments on agencies. l28 It serves as evidence of 
the congressional deference to and reliance on administrative deci-
sionmaking. 129 Such deference is largely due to the expertise that 
Congress believes to reside within federal agencies. 130 Congress's 
reliance on agency expertise is particularly strong in the area of 
environmental protection and regulation. 131 Environmental law is 
"qualitatively different" from all other areas of law in the SUbtlety 
of relationships involved and the complex balancing process that it 
entails. 132 Agencies such as the BLM have at their command the 
specialized knowledge and resources needed to make the complex 
decisions surrounding the consumption and protection of the envi-
ronment. 133 
c. The Presumption against Preclusion 
Despite congressional authority to deny judicial review, courts 
have retained a "strong presumption" that Congress intends to pro-
vide judicial review of administrative actions. l34 Historically, courts 
have required "clear and convincing" evidence of the congressional 
intent to deny such judicial review. 135 While the courts may confirm 
127 Id. § 701; see also, Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1097 (7th Cir.) (APA review not 
available to plaintiffs when federal statute specifically precluded such review), een. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 509 (1990). 
128 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988). 
129 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433 (1944); Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 
716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988). 
130 See Bolduan, supra note 16, at 373; see also Yakus, 321 U.S. at 433; Northern Spotted 
Owl, 716 F. Supp. at 483. 
131 See Bolduan, supra note 16, at 372. 
132 I d. at 373. 
133 Id. 
134 See, e.g., Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) 
(Court requires clear and convincing evidence of legislative intent in order to restrict access 
to judicial review); Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 413 (1977) (plaintiffs met heavy burden of 
overcoming presumption that Congress did not intend to preclude judicial review); Abbott 
Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (judicial review requires clear and convincing 
evidence of legislative intent). 
136 See, e.g., Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974); Abbott Lab., 387 U.S. at 141. 
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statutory provisions excluding review, they more often have ex-
pressed concern for the constitutionality of such provisions. 136 
This concern has led to what one commentator characterized as 
"tortured statutory construction" by courts in their attempts to avoid 
even clear expressions that judicial review has been precluded. 137 
For example, in an effort to avoid complete preclusion of judicial 
review, courts may define the statute in question narrowly in order 
to create an exception to what may appear to be a complete denial 
of jurisdiction. This was the case in Portland Audubon Society v. 
Hodel. 138 
D. Portland Audubon Society v. Hodel 
Portland Audubon Society139 was the first notable challenge to 
one of Senator Hatfield's riders.140 In this case, the plaintiffs, who 
represented the interests of various environmental groups including 
the Wilderness Society and the Sierra Club, sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief to stop the BLM's planned timber sales of tracts of 
old-growth timber located in seven separate management districts. 141 
Specifically, the plaintiffs sought an injunction to halt all timber sales 
that included old-growth trees within a two-mile radius of the habitat 
of the northern spotted owl. 142 They based their action upon the 
BLM's alleged violation of several federal statutes, including 
NEPA 143 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act144 
(FLMPA).145 The plaintiffs claimed that these statutes were violated 
186 See Johnson, 415 U.S. at 367; see also Note, Congressional Preclusion of Judicial 
Review of Federal Benefit Disbursement: Reasserting Separation of Powers, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 778, 779 (1984) [hereinafter Congressional Preclusion]. 
137 See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel 866 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1989); Bartlett 
v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (despite what appeared to be clear preclusion of 
judicial review, court determined, based on "common sense construction of [the] provisions in 
light of manifest congressional purpose and lurking constitutional infirmity," that Congress 
had not precluded constitutional challenges). 
138 See 866 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1989). 
139 [d. at 302. 
140 See id. at 304. 
141 See id. at 303-04. 
142 [d. at 304. 
143 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988). 
144 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1752 (1988). 
145 See Hodel, 866 F.2d at 303. Plaintiffs did not challenge the timber sales under the ESA, 
because, at the time of the lawsuit, the spotted owl was not listed as an endangered species 
under the Act. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1989) 
(United States Fish and Wildlife Service's decision not to list northern spotted owl under 
ESA was arbitrary and capricious). 
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by the BLM's failure to consider new scientific studies indicating 
that the planned logging of the old-growth timber would destroy the 
northern spotted owl's habitat and contribute to the owl's ultimate 
extinction. 146 
The United States District Court for the District of Oregon re-
fused to consider the plaintiffs' claim on the grounds that section 314 
of the 1988 continuing budget resolution had withdrawn the court's 
jurisdiction. 147 Section 314 provided, in pertinent part, that no ex-
isting resource management plan shall be challenged on the sole 
basis that it does not incorporate information available subsequent 
to its completion. 148 The district court refused to review the BLM's 
activities despite its own acknowledgment that NEPA regulations 
required the agency to take into consideration new information bear-
ing on the environmental impacts of proposed actions. 149 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit found that this lawsuit was the particular lawsuit that the 
sponsors of section 314 had intended to prevent. 150 The court never-
theless remanded the case back to the district court for further 
factfinding. 151 It ordered the district court to determine both whether 
the BLM knew of the information regarding the possible threat to 
the spotted owl prior to its adoption of the plan and whether the 
plaintiffs' NEPA challenge was against the plan or particular activ-
ities under the plan. 152 
On remand, the district court found that the BLM decision not to 
supplement the EIS was arbitrary and capricious in light of the 
significant information regarding the potential threat to the spotted 
owl. 153 Despite this finding, the district court again found that the 
146 Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 21,210, 21,211 
(D. Or. Apr. 1988). 
147 I d. at 21,213. 
148 See Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 314, 101 
Stat. 1329, 1329-254 (1987), reprinted in 133 CONGo REC. H12,468 (1987). 
149 See Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) at 21,211; see also Bolduan, supra note 
16, at 346. 
150 Hodel, 866 F.2d at 305. According to the court, ''the sponsors intended to stop this 
particular lawsuit and to permit the sales to go forward without further delay." Id. 
161 See id. at 309. 
162 See id. at 307. Although § 314 denied judicial review of the existing plan in light of new 
information available subsequent to the plan's completion, it did not prohibit challenges to 
particular activities carried out under existing plans. See Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 314, 101 Stat. 1329, 1329-254 (1987), reprinted in 133 CONGo 
REC. H12,468 (1987). For an example of a court applying this distinction, see City of Tenakee 
Springs v. Clough, 750 F. Supp. 1406, 1415 (D. Alaska 1990). 
163 Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1485 (D. Or.), aff'd in part, 884 
F.2d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470 (1989). 
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rider precluded its jurisdiction. 154 On the appeal of the remand, the 
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's conclusion that section 314 
precluded the plaintiffs' claim. 155 The Supreme Court declined to 
hear the case, letting the Ninth Circuit's ruling stand. 156 
Portland Audubon Society clearly exemplifies the judicial ten-
dency to define a bill narrowly in order to avoid the complete pre-
clusion of jurisdiction, notwithstanding the obvious intent of the 
legislature. Although the district court recognized that the plaintiffs' 
lawsuit was the exact type of lawsuit that the sponsors of section 
314 had intended to enjoin, it did not find that Congress necessarily 
had adopted the expressed intent of the sponsors.157 Rather, the 
court indicated that there existed substantial doubt as to whether 
Congress intended to bar legal challenges to individual timber 
sales. 158 As a result, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case back to 
the district court so that it could determine whether the plaintiffs 
were challenging the existing plan or merely individual timber 
sales. 159 Despite the court's narrow interpretation of the rider, the 
district court found that the plaintiffs had challenged the existing 
plan, and that, therefore, the rider precluded the court's review. 1OO 
In sum, through an appropriations bill, Senator Hatfield success-
fully has precluded review of a BLM decision that violated APA 161 
as well as NEP A requirements. 162 As a direct result of these viola-
tions, the BLM may have irreversibly threatened the already dimin-
ishing spotted owl population of the Oregon and Washington old-
growth forests. 163 
154 [d. at 1489. 
155 Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir.), cen. denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 1470 (1989). The court remanded the plaintiff's non-NEPA claims which did not address 
the BLM's decision not to prepare a supplemental EIS. [d. at 1240, 1242. 
156 [d. 
157 [d.; cf Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 192--93 (1978) (comments made in 
appropriations bill represent only personal views of committee members and do not change 
Congress's intent prior to bill's passage). 
158 Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1989). 
159 [d. at 308, 309. 
160 Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1489 (D. Or. 1989). On remand, 
the district court found that the plaintiffs were challenging the existing plan and not a 
particular activity. [d. 
161 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. The APA provides in part that the reviewing court shall set aside 
agency "action, findings, and conclusions" found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." [d. § 706(2)(a); see also Lujan, 712 F. 
Supp. at 1485. 
162 See NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988); see also Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 
18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210, 21,211 (D. Or. Apr. 1988); Lujan, 712 F. Supp. at 
1485. 
163 See Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl L. Inst.) at 21,211. The United States Court of 
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO PRECLUDE 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A. The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers 
In Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson,164 environmental groups 
again asked the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
to review federal agency activity that one of Senator Hatfield's 
riders, section 318 of the Interior Appropriations Act for the fiscal 
year 1990, had deemed unreviewable. 165 In February 1989, several 
environmental organizations had filed a complaint in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Washington for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging certain timber man-
agement guidelines that they believed did not provide adequate 
protection to the spotted owl. l66 Prior to the district court's ruling, 
Congress enacted section 318 of the Interior Appropriations Act. 167 
The relevant provisions of section 318 directly addressed the pending 
case. 168 The rider stated that the then current management plan for 
BLM lands in Oregon and Washington gave adequate consideration 
to the protection of the spotted owl for the purposes of the statutes 
that formed the basis for the plaintiffs' claims in Seattle Audubon 
Society.169 In addition, the rider removed the possibility of further 
judicial review of the management plan. 170 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the irreversible threat to the old-growth ecosystem 
in Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 895 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 2621 (1990). In Mohla, the court held that § 314 barred another challenge to a USFS plan 
on the grounds that it violated NEPA. [d. at 630. The challenged plan failed to incorporate 
new information regarding possible detrimental environmental impacts of timber harvesting 
on the old-growth ecosystem. See id. 
164 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990). 
165 [d. at 1312. 
166 [d. at 1313. 
167 See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal 
Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701, 745-750 (1989). 
166 The rider states that: 
[d. 
Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to 
subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national forests in Oregon 
and Washington and Bureau of Land Management lands in western Oregon known 
to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting 
the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases captioned 
Seattle Audubon Society et aI., v. F. Dale Robertson .... The guidelines adopted 
by subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section shall not be subject to judicial review 
by any court of the United States. 
169 [d. 
170 [d. 
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Section 318 was sufficiently explicit to require the district court 
to dismiss Seattle Audubon Society and vacate a previously issued 
preliminary injunction against BLM timber sales that the congres-
sional guidelines in the appropriations bill authorized.171 On appeal, 
the plaintiffs reasserted the argument that they had presented in 
the district court that section 318 violated the separation of powers 
doctrine. 172 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and held that section 
318 violated the separation of powers doctrine as set forth in United 
States v. Klein. 173 In Klein,174 the Supreme Court held that Congress 
cannot prescribe through a statute a rule that requires a court to 
decide a given case in a particular way.175 The plaintiff in Klein 
brought suit under a law that allowed noncombatant landowners, 
upon a showing of proof of their loyalty to the federal government, 
to recover proceeds from property that federal agents sold during 
the Civil War. 176 In an earlier case, the Supreme Court had held that 
a presidential pardon was sufficient proof of loyalty to satisfy the 
requirements of this law. 177 Given proof that the deceased landowner 
in Klein had received a pardon, the Court of Claims awarded recov-
ery.178 While the case was on appeal, however, Congress passed a 
law stating that a presidential pardon was not evidence of loyalty 
and directing courts to dismiss any case in which the claimant pre-
vailed due to such evidence of loyalty. 179 
The Supreme Court opined in Klein that Congress had over-
stepped its powers by mandating a judicial conclusion. l80 According 
to the Court, the three coordinate branches of the federal govern-
ment, by operating within their own spheres of authority, fulfill the 
important function of preventing their governmental counterparts 
from exceeding their constitutionally delegated powers.181 Article 
III of the Constitution vests the judicial power in "one supreme 
Court and such inferior courts as Congress may from time to time 
deem necessary to create. "182 The Court concluded in Klein that 
171 See 914 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990). 
172 Id. at 1312. 
173 Id. at 1317. 
174 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
176 See id. at 146. 
176 See id. at 137. 
177 See id. at 140. 
178 See id. at 143. 
179 See id. 
ISO See id. at 147. 
181 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871). 
182 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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Congress intruded upon the courts' judicial power when it forced 
them to apply a rule of decision that violated their own judgment as 
to the status of the law. 183 Since the decision in Klein, courts have 
found statutes to be in violation of the separation of powers if they 
demand a court to reach a particular outcome or to make a particular 
factual finding that is contrary to the actual state of the law. 184 
In Seattle Audubon Society, the Ninth Circuit held that section 
318 did not establish new law but rather directed courts to make 
certain findings of fact under existing law so as to reach a specific 
result in two pending federal cases. 185 The court noted that, although 
courts should make every possible effort to find a given statute 
constitutional,l86 in this instance, Congress had prescribed a rule for 
the decision of a case without changing the underlying laws. 187 
The Ninth Circuit did describe, however, how Congress might 
achieve the same result without running afoul of the separation of 
powers doctrine. 188 It compared section 318 to a rider that reached 
nearly the same results as section 318,189 but that the court held to 
be valid. The "valid" rider, rather than positing that the agency's 
actions were per se lawful, merely authorized the agency to continue 
with its project notwithstanding the requirements of any environ-
mental statutes. 190 In essence, the "valid" rider was similar to the 
predecessors of section 318. These early riders merely denied judicial 
review of BLM activities, whether or not the activities complied 
with the applicable statutes, while section 318 asserted that BLM 
activities complied with these statutes and therefore were not sub-
183 See Klein, 80 U.S. at 147. 
184 See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371,404-07 (1980); Grimesy 
v. Huffy, 876 F.2d 738, 745 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1620 (1991); In re Consol 
U.S. Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 820 F.2d 982, 992 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 
905 (1988). 
185 914 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990). 
186 Id.; see Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974). The "cardinal" rule is that courts 
first will determine whether there is any possible statutory construction that will allow them 
to avoid the constitutional question. Id. 
187 Seattle Audubon, 914 F.2d at 1317. The court went on to comment that even if Congress 
intended § 318 to be a temporary repeal of certain environmental laws, Congress could not 
accomplish such a repeal in an appropriations bill. Id. 
188 Id. at 1316. 
189 See id.; see also Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1423 (9th Cir. 1989) (Hawaiian 
citizens group challenged constitutionality of appropriations bill provision that authorized 
Secretary of Transportation to build highway notwithstanding possible violations of environ-
mental laws). 
190 See Stop H-3, 870 F.2d at 1423. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit found that the appropriations bill provision's clear intent was to exempt the project 
from complying with certain environmental statutes. Id. at 1425; see also Continuing Appro-
priations Bill for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 114, 100 Stat. 1783, 1783-349 (1987). 
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ject to judicial review. 191 In other words, according to the Ninth 
Circuit's own analysis, the separation of powers doctrine did not 
apply to the early riders. 192 Therefore, the court's application of the 
separation of powers doctrine in Seattle Audubon Society is of very 
limited precedential value. 
B. Constitutional Limits on Agency Discretion 
The separation of powers doctrine not only prevents Congress 
from acting like a court but also requires that Congress retain some 
control over the agencies to whom it delegates some of its power. 193 
Agencies cannot make decisions, even in their areas of expertise, 
completely unfettered by outside influence or control. 194 In order to 
be constitutional, every statute must provide some guidelines, some 
formal rules that will aid agencies in their day-to-day decisionmak-
ing.195 In Yakus v. United States,196 the Supreme Court established 
that the congressional delegation of power to an agency will be 
constitutional as long as Congress sufficiently delineates the field in 
which the agency is meant to act. 197 The Court reasoned that agency 
standards allow courts to determine objectively whether an agency 
has complied with congressional intent and policy. 198 
Deferring to agency decisionmaking without allowing for any for-
mal judicial review is particularly troublesome when an agency's 
191 See, e.g., Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Fiscal 
Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-446, § 314, 102 Stat. 1774, 1825-26 (1988) (merely prohibits 
challenges of existing plans on sole basis that they do not incorporate new information without 
mentioning underlying environmental laws); Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-446, § 321, 102 Stat. 1774, 1827 (1988) 
(denies judicial review of all NEPA and other statutory claims for 1989 timber sales in 
Mapelton Ranger District, but expressly states that it does not represent judgment as to 
whether plan has complied with statutes). 
192 Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990). 
193 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944). 
194 See id. 
196 See id. at 426. 
196 321 U. S. 414 (1944). 
197 See id. at 425. The Court did not specifically define "sufficient delineation." I d. at 425-
26. According to the Court, the separation of powers doctrine does not deny Congress the 
power to give an adminstrative officer ample latitude to ascertain when to put the legislative 
command into operation. Id. at 425. Only if there is a complete absence of standards to guide 
an administrator's actions, so that it would be impossible to ascertain the will of Congress, 
will the court be justified in overriding the legislative choice. I d. at 426. 
198 See id. at 425; see also Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 
354 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1965) (court's duty is to see that agency's decisions receive careful 
consideration which statute contemplates); Bolduan, supra note 16, at 373-75. 
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actions touch on a constitutional question. 199 Congress has never 
attempted explicitly to deny judicial review of the constitutionality 
of its legislation or of the acts of federal agencies, and many courts 
have expressed more than an "uncomfortableness" at the prospect 
of such an attempt. 200 
Congress's acknowledged power to remove judicial review in and 
of itself arguably gives rise to a constitutional objection.201 For in-
stance, under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, the govern-
ment, whether through the legislature or an administrative body, 
may not deprive an individual of his or her property without first 
providing that individual with due process of law. 202 If a statute 
authorizes an agency to deprive an individual of a constitutionally 
protected interest without providing some procedure to guard 
against error or misconduct, such as judicial review, a court must 
deem that statute unconstitutional. 203 In other words, when judicial 
review is the only form of redress that an individual has to enforce 
a constitutional right in the face of agency action, Congress cannot 
take that remedy away, despite its power to remove judicial review 
in circumstances where the Constitution is not implicated. 204 
C. The Constitutional Right to Due Process205 
An individual has a constitutional right to due process before the 
government can take away his or her life, liberty, or property if that 
interest falls within the purview of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 206 The range of interests that the Constitution 
protects is not infinite,207 but at the same time, the concepts oflife,208 
199 See Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368, 373 (1974); Reardon v. United States, 731 
F. Supp. 558, 569 (D. Mass. 1990). 
200 See Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct. 2047, 2053 (1988) (to deny any judicial forum to colorable 
constitutional claim would raise constitutional question); Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 704 
(D. C. Cir. 1987) (limitation on the jurisdiction of federal courts to review the constitutionality 
of federal legislation would be unconstitutional infringement of due process); Reardon, 731 F. 
Supp. at 569 (Congress has power to limit forum in which constitutional claims are brought, 
but "all agree" that Congress cannot bar all remedies enforcing constitutional rights). 
201 See Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 569. 
202 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564,569-70 & n.7 (1972). 
203 See Reardon, 731 F. Supp. at 569. 
204 See id. 
205 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that no person shall "be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
206 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332; Roth, 408 U.S. at 571. 
207 Roth, 408 U.S. at 570. 
208 "Life" has be defined vary narrowly, so no real controversy exists as to the application 
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liberty, and property are not limited to their strict literal defini-
tions. 209 
1. Property Interests 
The Constitution does not create property interests. Rather, they 
are created, and their dimensions defined, by existing rules that 
stem from independent sources such as state law.210 Thus, for ex-
ample, an individual may have a protected property interest in some-
thing to which he or she holds less than an actual ownership inter-
est. 211 In fact, in the context of due process, property often means 
an entitlement of some sort.212 
Property interests are distinguishable from liberty interests in 
that property interests are founded on the procedural aspects of due 
process, not substantive rights inherent in the Constitution. 213 The 
government can create a protected property interest or entitlement 
merely through its conduct and representations if that is what both 
parties understand to be taking place. 214 For its holder to assert 
Fifth Amendment protections, however, the property interest or 
entitlement must be "objectively justifiable."215 It must be more than 
a "unilateral expectation. "216 For example, if a benefit is subject to 
the discretion of an agency, it is not a protectable interest. 217 Com-
ofthe term. See United States v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp. 1306, 1307 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (Constitution 
expressly provides for protection of right to one's own life in Fifth Amendment). 
209 Roth, 408 U.S. at 571; Nicoletti v. Brown, 740 F. Supp. 1268, 1281 (N.D. Ohio 1987). 
210 See Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 726 F. Supp. 1142, 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (a disabled 
firefighter had no protected property interest when he could not identify state law or other 
independent source that granted him right to continue to receive salary when he was no 
longer able to work). 
211 As the Court states in Board of Regents v. Roth, "the property interests protected by 
procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or 
money." 408 U.S. at 572. 
212 Schroeder, 726 F. Supp. at 1143 (in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, property 
means an entitlement). 
213 See Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F.2d 916,922 (2d Cir. 1980). 
214 Doran v. Houle, 721 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 950 (1984) 
(quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972». 
215 Moore v. Johnson, 582 F.2d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1978). 
216 [d.; see also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
217 See Moore, 582 F.2d at 1234-35; see also Doran, 721 F.2d at 1185. "Where the govern-
ment, as the source of the. interest in question, retains unrestricted discretion over future 
enjoyment of the interest, the interest is not a protected entitlement." Doran, 721 F.2d at 
1185. In Moore, plaintiffs claimed that their interest in receiving certain vocational training 
benefits was constitutionally protected. 582 F.2d at 1232-33. In Doran, veterinarians claimed 
a constitutionally protected property interest in a government permit that allowed them to 
perform a specific test for brucellosis in cattle. 721 F.2d 1183. These are just two of an endless 
number of benefits that individuals have claimed to be protectable interest. See, e.g., Schroeder 
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plete discretion removes the certainty necessary for an expectation 
to be legitimate. 218 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit posited 
in Grace Towers Tenants Association v. Grace Housing Development 
Fundp9 that legislative restrictions on agency action may be enough 
to create a legitimate and protectable entitlement. 22o In Grace Tow-
ers, the plaintiffs were tenants of a housing project that was receiv-
ing a below-market interest rate mortgage pursuant to a federal 
housing statute. 221 The plaintiffs claimed that a United States De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) procedure that 
resulted in a twenty-three percent increase in rent constituted a 
violation of their due process rights.222 In dicta, the court noted that 
there must be at least some statutory restrictions on the agency's 
actions that would give rise to a legitimate expectation. 223 On the 
grounds that these plaintiffs could not reasonably expect to partici-
pate in the decisionmaking process, which Congress had left to the 
experienced discretion of HUD, the court declined the plaintiffs' 
contention that they had a protected interest.224 In sum, if the gov-
ernment retains "unrestricted" discretion over the future enjoyment 
of an interest, it is not an interest that the Fifth Amendment pro-
tects. 225 
2. Liberty Interests 
Unlike property interests, liberty interests are rooted in consti-
tutional and historical traditions. 226 The definition of liberty, how-
ever, has been expanded beyond the contextual meaning of the 
word.227 Liberty interests include interests arising both from specific 
v. City of Chicago, 726 F.2d 1142, 1144 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (disabled firefighter claimed that right 
to receive salary was a protectable interest); Nicoletti v. Brown, 740 F. Supp. 1268, 1281 
(N.D. Ohio 1987) (mentally retarded persons claimed that right to reside in a federally certified 
medicaid facility was a protectable interest). 
218 See Moore, 582 F.2d at 1233. 
219 538 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1976). 
220 See id. at 495. 
221 See id. at 493. 
223 Grace Towers Tennants Ass'n v. Grace Housing Dev. Fund, 583 F.2d 491, 492-94 (2d 
Cir. 1976). 
223 See id. at 494. 
224 Id. 
225 Doran v. Houle, 721 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1983). 
226 See Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1435 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 712 
(1991). 
227 See id. 
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privileges enumerated in the Bill of Rights and from fundamental 
rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted 
in the Nation's history and tradition."228 Courts have defined liberty 
to include not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the 
right to contract, to engage in a common occupation, and to enjoy 
those privileges recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness. 229 This list is by no means exhaustive. 230 
As with property interests, a variety of statutorily created rights 
have been held to be protected liberty interests. Such interests, 
however, must be grounded in notions of fundamental freedoms even 
though they are statutorily created. 231 In Pugliese v. Nelson, 232 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied a 
federal prisoner's claim that he could not be reclassified as a "central 
monitoring case" (CMC)233 without due process because the benefits 
normally associated with non-CMC status were not guaranteed to 
him prior to his reclassification. 234 In reaching its conclusion, the 
court noted that a protected liberty interest, for purposes of due 
process, must be one assured by statute or regulation.235 For ex-
ample, a protected liberty interest would exist where the inmate 
currently enjoyed, or could reasonably expect to enjoy, a substantial 
benefit upon the happening of certain conditions.236 If an inmate had 
a reasonable expectation that he would be paroled for displaying 
good behavior, that opportunity could not be taken away without 
adequate justification. 237 
Congress may create a legitimate and protectable liberty interest 
by restricting an agency's actions in some way.238 These restrictions 
may take the form of procedures mandated by a legislature or the 
agency itself, which by their very nature imply that entity's intent 
228 Id. 
229 Nicoletti v. Brown, 740 F. Supp. 1268, 1281-82 (N.D. Ohio 1987). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 1282; see also Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1182, 1185 (5th Cir. 1990). 
232 617 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1980). 
233 Id. at 918-19. The Bureau of Prisons designation of a prisoner as a "Central Monitoring 
Case" can hinder or preclude a prisoner from obtaining, among other things, social furloughs, 
work releases and transfers to other correctional institutions among other things. Id. at 918. 
Under the central monitoring system the prison can control the transfer and community 
activites of inmates who present special management concerns. [d. 
234 Id. at 922. 
235 Id. 
236 [d. 
237 Id. 
238 See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983); Nicoletti v. Brown, 740 F. Supp. 1268, 
1282 (N.D. Ohio 1987). 
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to protect some affected interest. 239 In Hewitt v. Helms,240 for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court held that an inmate in a Pennsylvania 
state prison had a protected liberty interest in continuing to reside 
with the general prison population.241 Notwithstanding the limited 
nature of a prisoner's rights, the Court found that the Pennsylvania 
statutory framework, which governed the administration of the state 
prison system, had given rise to this protected liberty interest. 242 
The statute in question required that a "threat of a serious disturb-
ance" take place before the administrative segregation of a prisoner 
could occur. 243 
According to the Court, the adoption of procedural guidelines for 
administrative decisionmaking regarding an inmate's living condi-
tions does not indicate, in and of itself, a protected interest. 244 None-
theless, in Hewitt, the unmistakably mandatory nature of the guide-
lines and the necessity that specific circumstances exist prior to their 
implementation created a protected liberty interest.245 Thus, a con-
stitutionally protected interest need only be one that some official 
action-whether a statutory or a judicial mandate-has guaranteed 
to an individual. 246 
3. Agency Action and the Requirements of Due Process 
The key factor in the creation of a protected interest is the degree 
of discretion that the statute in question gives to an agency.247 With 
regard to both property and liberty interests, whether a statute or 
regulation gives rise to a protected interest depends upon whether 
it places "substantive limits on official discretion. "248 The regulation 
must contain specific directives to the decisionmaker that, if certain 
specified circumstances are present, a particular outcome must fol-
low, that outcome being the protected interest. 249 
239 See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72. 
240 459 U.S. 460 (1983). 
241 Id. at 463, 472. The United States Supreme Court held that, although the inmate had 
a protected liberty interest, the process afforded him by the state of Pennsylvannia satisfied 
due process requirements. Id. at 477. 
242 Id. at 466-67. 
243 See id. at 472. 
244 See id. at 471. 
245 Id. at 471-72. 
246 See Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F.2d 916, 922 (2d Cir. 1980). 
247 Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72. 
248 See Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 904 F.2d 719, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Kentucky 
Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct. 1904, 1910 (1989», cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 955 
(1991). 
249 Id.; see also Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472. 
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Once a protected interest has been created, the government or its 
agents cannot take it away without due process.25O Due process is 
not necessarily synonymous with judicial review, but rather is a fluid 
concept bound by time, place, and circumstance.251 Although due 
process may not require a formal hearing in a federal or state 
court,252 Congress is not free to establish any process as due pro-
cess.253 There are minimal requirements inherent in the concept of 
due process that are defined by notions of fairness and justice. 254 
For example, a court may find that the administrative procedures a 
statute provides are sufficient to satisfy due process. 255 
Due process merely requires some mechanism or forum for an 
individual to express himself or herself in an effort to preserve his 
or her rights. 256 In Schalk v. Reilly,257 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit refused to recognize a right to 
procedural due process after Congress had removed from the federal 
courts the jurisdiction to review challenges to United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) remedial action plans. 258 In re-
jecting the plaintiffs' claim, the court noted that the plaintiffs had 
received many opportunities to express their point of view during 
the administrative process259 and would receive many more such 
opportunities in the future. 26o The government demonstrated that it 
had taken the plaintiffs' environmental concerns into consideration 
250 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976); Moore v. Johnson, 582 F.2d 1228, 
1234 (9th Cir. 1978). 
251 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. 
252 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 & n.7 (1972). 
258 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855). "[The 
Fifth Amendment] is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial 
powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any 
'process due process of law,' by its mere will." [d. 
254 See Murray's Les.~ee, 59 U.S. at 276-77; see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 
(due process bars Congress from "enactments that shock the sense of fair play"), reh'g denied, 
348 U.S. 852 (1954). 
255 See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
255 See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 
U.S. 254, 266-70 (1970) (hearing similar to judicial trial was necessary prior to termination of 
welfare benefits). 
257 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990). 
2"8 See id. at 1094-95. 
259 [d. at 1098. The court noted that the "proposed consent decree was subjected to intensive 
public scrutiny, including 14 public meetings, media interviews and votes before various city, 
county and state governmental bodies." [d. at 1093. In addition, the EPA lodged the consent 
decree with the district court for a 30-day public comment period, that was subsequently 
extended for two weeks at the request of area residents. [d. at 1094. 
260 See id. at 1093-94. 
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by responding to the community criticisms in its formal request for 
court approval of a consent decree. 261 Similarly, in Creppel v. United 
States Corps of Engineers,262 the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Louisiana held that there was no violation of 
the plaintiffs' right to due process when they had had an opportunity 
to express their views at a hearing and send written comments to 
the Army Corps of Engineers. 263 All in all, many statutes and agency 
guidelines provide such opportunities for concerned individuals to 
protect their rights. 264 When a court determines that a hearing is 
required, it also identifies the form that hearing must take in order 
to satisfy due process. 265 
The Supreme Court has established a balancing test to determine 
the necessary procedural protections under due process. 266 This bal-
ancing test considers the governmental concern for efficiency as well 
as the importance of the benefit or entitlement at stake. 267 In M a-
thews v. Eldridge,268 the Supreme Court set forth three factors that 
courts should consider when determining what due process requires 
in a particular situation. 269 The court should look to the nature of 
the private interest at stake, the risk that the individual could be 
deprived of that interest erroneously under current procedures, and 
the burden to the government of providing additional procedures. 270 
261 See id. at 1094. 
262 500 F. Supp. 1108 (E.n. La. 1980). 
263 [d. at 1120. Plaintiff landowners brought suit to compel the Army Corps of Engineers 
to authorize flood control projects under their original plan. [d. The original plan called for 
the drainage of certain swamp and marsh land located behind a newly constructed levee 
system. [d. at 1112. The EPA determined that the Corps original plan would result in the 
irretrievable loss of valuable wetlands. [d. at 1113. 
264 See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476-77 (1983); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
349 (1976). 
265 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972). 
266 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. 
267 See Moore v. Johnson, 582 F.2d 1228 (9th Cir. 1978). In Moore, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit warned that the "imprecise contours" of due process principles 
require a careful examination of the facts of each case. If the principles are read too narrowly, 
courts may sacrifice highly valued expectations to satisfy only marginal governmental needs. 
In contrast, too broad an application would result in the accommodation of the property 
interest holder at the expense of a valuable governmental need. [d. at 1233; see also Congres-
sional Preclusion, supra note 136, at 788-89. 
268 424 U.S 319 (1976). 
269 [d. at 334-35. 
270 [d. In Mathews, the Court described the three factors in its balancing test as follows: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 
the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
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Thus, a court will delve into the context of the deprivation to deter-
mine whether the present procedural safeguards are sufficient to 
comply with due process. 271 
One traditional exception to this rule is that a right given to many 
individuals can find protection only through the democratic pro-
cess. 272 In Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado,273 taxpayers 
brought a suit to enjoin the Colorado State Board of Equalization 
enforcing a board-ordered increase on the valuation of all taxable 
property.274 The plaintiffs claimed that the order denied them their 
property without due process of law, as they had no opportunity to 
voice their opinions regarding the tax increase. 275 In finding that it 
was impracticable to allow every affected citizen to have a direct 
voice in the adoption of a tax increase, the Supreme Court com-
mented that there must be a limit to individual due process if gov-
ernment is to continue to function effectively. 276 
In contrast, under Londoner v. Denver,277 when the state legisla-
ture delegated the duty of fixing a tax to a subordinate body-which 
was to determine what amount and upon whom the tax would be 
levied-due process required some opportunity for the taxpayers to 
be heard before the tax was irrevocably fixed. 278 When such a cir-
cumstance exists, more than simply an opportunity to submit objec-
tions in writing is required by due process.279 The distinction that 
the court drew was based on whether the legislative body had denied 
a property interest pursuant to a classwide policy determination as 
opposed to an individual determination.280 When a benefit is with-
drawn on the basis of a classwide policy, due process does not require 
that the state afford each affected individual a hearing. 281 
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
Id. at 335. 
271 See id. at 334. 
272 See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); see also O'Bannon v. 
Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 800 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Hoffman v. 
City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608, 620 (1st Cir. 1990). 
273 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
274 Id. at 443-44. 
275 Bi-Metallic, 329 U.S. at 444. 
276 See id. at 445. 
277 210 U.S. 373 (1908). 
278 See id. at 385. 
279 Id. at 386 (due process demands hearing so that anyone entitled to due process shall 
have opportunity to support their claims by argument, however informal). 
280 See Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909 F.2d 608, 620 (1st Cir. 1990) (statute that might 
otherwise give rise to an entitlement, ceases to provide entitlement requiring individual 
process when uniform policy of not enforcing statute is adopted or statute is withdrawn). 
281 Id. 
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Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion in O'Bannon v. Town 
Court Nursing Center,282 described this distinction in terms of a 
balancing of interests. 283 According to Justice Blackmun, when gov-
ernmental actions affect more than a few individuals, "concerns be-
yond economy, efficiency, and expedition tip the balance against 
finding that due process attaches. "284 As the sweep of governmental 
action broadens, so to does the power of the affected group to protect 
its interests outside of constitutionally imposed procedures. 285 More-
over, the case for due process protection is stronger when the iden-
tity of the person affected by a government choice becomes clearer; 
it becomes stronger still when the precise nature of the effect on 
each individual is made more definite. 286 Government actions that 
single out specific individuals for specialized treatment are the par-
ticular concern of due process, because they raise questions as to 
the reasons for the specialized treatment and thus activate the need 
to heard. 287 
D. A Constitutional Right to Environmental Preservation 
Despite the growing importance of environmental protection, 
courts still do not view the public's interest in the environment as 
one that reaches the level of a constitutional right and thus garners 
substantive due process protection. 288 In In re "Agent Orange" Li-
ability Litigation,289 for example, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of N ew York dismissed the plaintiffs' con-
stitutional claims because there was "not yet a constitutional right 
to a healthful environment."290 The plaintiffs had claimed a right 
under the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to be free 
from exposure to the toxic chemicals the defendant corporation had 
manufactured. 291 
Several years earlier, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit noted that, while there appeared to be growing sup-
282 447 U.S. 773 (1980). The Court held that elderly patients have no interest in receiving 
benefits for care in a particular nursing home that entitles them to a hearing prior to decer-
tification of that facility. Id. at 789. 
283 Id. at 800 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
284 O'Bannon, 447 U.S. at 800. 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 801. 
287 Id. 
288 See lzaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 361 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 1092 (1981). 
289 475 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
200 I d. at 934. 
291 Agent Orange, 475 F. Supp. at 934. 
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port for constitutional protection of the environment, no court as yet 
had given life to this new doctrine. 292 Despite the hesitancy of the 
judiciary to recognize that society's interest in the environment may 
warrant constitutional protection, plaintiffs continue to claim sub-
stantive due process protections for their rights in the environ-
ment. 293 As recently as 1989, a Hawaiian citizens' group asked the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to recognize 
the right to a healthy environment as an " important individual right" 
in order to warrant the application of stricter judicial scrutiny to 
legislation affecting that right.294 While the court found that it did 
not have to reach this issue, it recognized the significance of envi-
ronmental preservation. 295 
Other courts not only have recognized the significance of environ-
mental protection but have gone a step further and acknowledged 
the possibility that constitutional protection for the environment may 
be found in the penumbras of the Ninth Amendment.296 The United 
States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, 
while declining to actually recognize such a right, did note the real 
possibility of such a doctrine.297 The court stated that such claims, 
even under the present Constitution, were not farfetched and some 
day could obtain judicial recognition.298 Despite the continued sup-
port for constitutional protection for the environment, however, no 
court yet has afforded generalized environmental concerns the status 
of a constitutional right. 299 
292 See Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971). In Ely, plaintiffs, in an action to 
enjoin construction of a penal facility in an area of historical significance, claimed that the 
defendant's failure to follow the procedures outlined in NEPA amounted to a violation of their 
constitutional rights. [d. 
293 See, e.g., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1429 (9th Cir. 1989); Hagedorn v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (N.D. W.Va. 1973). 
294 Stop H-3 Ass'n, 870 F.2d at 1429. 
295 [d. at 1430. The court noted: 
[d. 
We agree that it is difficult to conceive of a more absolute and enduring concern than 
the preservation and, increasingly, the restoration of a decent and livable environ-
ment. Human life, itself a fundamental right, will vanish if we continue our heedless 
exploitation of this planet's natural resources. The centrality of the environment to 
all of our undertakings gives individuals a vital stake in maintaining its integrity. 
296 See Hagedorn, 363 F. Supp. at 1064. 
297 [d. 
298 [d. 
299 See, e.g., Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(court rejected plaintiffs' claim that generalized environmental concerns constitute protectable 
property or liberty interest), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); MacNamara v. County Council 
of Sussex County, 738 F. Supp. 134, 142 (D. Del. 1990) (court rejected plaintiffs' claim that 
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Recently, several environmental groups attempted to claim pro-
cedural, rather than substantive, due process protection for their 
interest in environmental preservation.30o In Izaak Walton League 
of America v. Ma'rsh,301 these groups claimed that APA entitled 
them to a full adjudicatory hearing prior to the Army Corps of 
Engineers' implementation of a project to replace the locks and dams 
in the upper Mississippi: a project that the groups claimed would 
adversely affect the river environment. 302 The United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected their claim, 
noting that it would extend due process protections only when a 
property or liberty interest was at stake. 303 According to the court, 
generalized environmental concerns did not constitute either inter-
est.304 In a more recent case, MacNamara v. County Council of 
Sussex County,305 the plaintiffs claimed that a statute created an 
entitlement to their health that was constitutionally protected. 306 
The statute in question provided that any zoning regulation adopted 
by Sussex County "shall be adopted for the pupose of promoting, 
among other things, the health of [its] inhabitants."307 Unlike the 
Isaak Walton League court, the United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware did not hold that a statute could not create 
such a right.3°S Rather, according to the MacNamara court, the 
language of the statute that the plaintiffs cited was not sufficiently 
obligatory to create a protectable entitlement. 309 
Some courts, however, have found that a statute or regulation can 
create a legally protected interest in environmental resources that 
is sufficient to give concerned citizens standing to challenge govern-
mental decisions. 31o Like due process, standing represents a judicial 
statute created protected property interest in their health and maintenance of existing prop-
erty values), aff'd without op., 922 F.2d 832 (3rd Cir. 1990); Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & 
Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. La. 1976) (court rejected plaintiffs' claim that 
penumbral protection of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments included right to be free from 
hazardous tobacco smoke), a/I'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1978), eert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073 
(1979). 
300 See Izaak Walton League, 655 F.2d at 36l. 
301 655 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
302 I d. at 361. 
303 Izaak Walton League, 655 F.2d at 36l. 
304 Id. 
305 738 F. Supp. 134 (D. Del.), a/I'd without op., 922 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1990). 
306 I d. at 14l. 
307 Id. 
308 Id. at 141-42. 
309 Id. 
310 See Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir.), eert. denied, 
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recognition of a plaintiff's special interest in the dispute at hand. 311 
Standing determines whether the party has alleged such a personal 
stake in the controversy that he or she will pursue its resolution 
with the necessary vigor.312 In addition, standing resembles due 
process in that a statute can create a new interest or right that gives 
standing to an individual who otherwise might have no judicially 
cognizable claim.313 In order to have standing, a party must be able 
to demonstrate not only that a statute may be invalid, but also that 
he or she has sustained or will sustain some direct injury as a result 
of the enforcement of that statute. 314 A general injury common to 
many or to citizens in general is not sufficient to give an individual 
standing.315 These requirements echo in many respects those nec-
essary in order to claim a statutory entitlement. 316 
In Citizens Committee for Hudson Valley v. Volpe,317 a citizens' 
group brought a suit against the Commissioner of the New York 
Department of Transportation alleging that certain provisions of a 
N ew York highway law were unconstitutional. 318 The plaintiffs raised 
the question whether the public interest in natural resources, scenic 
beauty, and historical value, which the defendant's actions directly 
threatened, were legally protected interests sufficient to afford the 
plaintiffs standing to pursue their constitutional claims. 319 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit answered this 
question in the affirmative by holding that the statutorily created 
public interest in natural resources was a legally protected interest 
400 U.S. 949 (1970); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 
608, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1965). 
3ll See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 
447, 488 (1923). 
312 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738. The Court acknowledged that the trend in lower courts 
is toward discarding the notion that a widely shared injury is automatically an injury insuffi-
cient to provide a basis for judicial review. Id. Nevertheless, the Court held that an environ-
mental organization's longstanding interest without more was insufficient to garner standing 
under APA. Id. at 739. 
313 See Scenic Hudson, 354 F.2d at 615. 
314 See Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488. 
315 Id. 
316 Id. 
317 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970). 
318 See id. at 102. Plaintiffs claimed that the discretion that New York's Highway Law 
granted the state's Commissioner of Transportation, to condemn property and fix routes, 
among other things, amounted to a violation of their right to due process. Id. at 106. Although 
the court acknowledged that the statutory bounds on the commissioner's discretion were 
indeed broad, it found no authority that allowed it to nullify the statutory delegation of 
discretionary powers on due process grounds. Id. at 106-07. 
319 See Volpe, 425 F.2d at 102-03. 
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that afforded the plaintiffs standing.32O By extension, an argument 
can be made that environmental legislation that creates a legally 
protectable interest in environmental protection sufficient for stand-
ing might also create an interest that rises to the level of a right 
protected by due process. 
v. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
The federal statute that expresses the broadest commitment to 
the protection and preservation of the environment is NEPA.321 
NEPA requires all federal agencies to consider environmental pre-
servation when making decisions in their areas of expertise. 322 
Most courts have viewed NEP A as providing procedural rather 
than substantive protection to the environment. 323 Some courts, how-
ever, have characterized NEP A as creating for all federal officials a 
substantive duty to take environmental values into account during 
their decisionmaking and planning processes. 324 NEPA establishes 
the federal government as a "trustee" of the environment for suc-
ceeding generations. 325 A trusteeship by its very nature imposes 
obligations on the trustee and provides corresponding benefits to the 
beneficiary. In this instance, the benefit that accrues from the gov-
ernmental obligation to consider environmental values is, in the 
words of NEPA, the creation of a "productive harmony" between 
the nation's economic needs and its environmental concerns. 326 
The obligation that the federal government has undertaken as 
"trustee" is to use all practicable means, consistent with other es-
sential national policies, to assure all United States citizens a health-
ful and productive environment. 327 This obligation is substantive, 
and to ensure that it is fulfilled, NEPA requires every federal agency 
320 I d. at 105. 
321 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1988). 
322 Id. § 4332; see also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy 
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
323 Noe v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 644 F.2d 434, 438 (5th Cir.) (NEPA 
does not give rise to private right of action against federal agency for failing to adhere to EIS 
requirement), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981). 
324 See Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1114; Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. S.C.R.A.P., 422 
U.S. 289, 319 (1975). As Justice Douglas noted, "NEPA is more than a technical statute of 
administrative procedure. It is a commitment to the preservation of our environment." Id. at 
331 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
325 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1988). 
326 Id. This harmony ideally will "assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and 
aesthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings." Id. 
327 Id. 
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to follow certain procedures. 328 The statute requires that every plan 
for a "major federal action" include a report on the environmental 
impacts of that agency action. 329 NEPA's requirement of an EIS-a 
formal statement listing, among other things, the unavoidable ad-
verse environmental impacts of a proposed action and alternatives 
to the proposed action330- provides evidence that the mandated 
balancing of interests has taken place.3al The interests being bal-
anced are the economic advantages and the environmental disadvan-
tages of each proposed action. 332 The mere fact that NEP A requires 
proof from every federal agency that the agency has applied "eco-
logical standards"333 to its decisionmaking illustrates the nondiscre-
tionary character of the government's obligation. 334 
Nowhere in NEPA's statement of policy or in its guidelines for 
agency compliance does Congress allow for exceptions or unre-
stricted agency discretion in the area of environmental preserva-
tion. 335 In fact, even when an agency is exempted from complying 
with NEPA's EIS requirement, the agency still is obligated to con-
sider the environmental impacts of its actions. 336 In Flint Ridge 
Development v. Scenic Rivers Association,3a7 the Supreme Court 
found that, if there is a clear and unavoidable conflict between other 
statutory authority and the duty to file an EIS, NEPA's require-
ment, is not applicable. 338 The issue before the court was whether 
NEPA required HUD to prepare an EIS before it could allow a 
disclosure statement completed by private developers to become 
effective.339 The disclosure statement was designed to prevent de-
328 See NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988); see also Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1115; Ely v. 
Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971). 
329 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1988). 
330 [d. § 4332(C)(iii). 
331 [d.; see Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1112. 
332 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1988). 
333 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 745 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
334 Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1112-13. As the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit noted, 
[t]he agency must not only observe the prescribed procedural requirements and 
actually take account of the factors specified, but it must also make a sufficiently 
detailed disclosure so that in the event of a later challenge to the agency's procedure, 
the courts will not be left to guess whether the requirements of . . . NEP A have 
been obeyed. 
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971). 
336 Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1114. 
336 See Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776, 791-92 (1976). 
337 426 U.S. 776 (1976). 
338 [d. at 788. 
339 [d. at 778. 
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ceptive practices in the sale of unimproved tracts of land by requiring 
developers to disclose needed information to potential buyers. 34o The 
Court determined in Flint Ridge that HUD was exempted from 
complying with the EIS requirement because of a clear and funda-
mental conflict between the agency's two statutory duties. 341 The 
Secretary of HUD could not comply simultaneously with its statu-
tory duty to allow statements of record to go into effect within thirty 
days of completion and its duty under NEPA to prepare an EIS.342 
The Secretary, however, did retain certain duties under NEP A 
despite his inability to complete an EIS, according to the Court. 343 
The Court noted that the Secretary, using his discretionary powers, 
could incorporate a wide range of environmental information into 
the property reports given to potential purchasers in order to comply 
with NEPA.344 Thus, even when NEPA's specific provisions cannot 
be directly applied, government officials retain a duty to consider 
the enviromental impacts of contemplated federal actions:345 a duty 
that is created by NEPA's substantive policies rather than its pro-
cedural provisions. 346 
VI. THE HATFIELD RIDERS ARE AN INVALID EXERCISE OF 
LEGISLATIVE POWER 
A. The Role of Judicial Review in Environmental Decisonmaking 
Senator Hatfield described his riders as a band-aid measure 
needed to ease the crisis caused by litigation, which has had "sweep-
ing effects" on timber management in his region. 347 In Senator Hat-
field's view, environmental groups are using the courts to circumvent 
sound agency decisionmaking in order to impose their own policies 
on government activities. 348 
340 [d. 
341 [d. at 778, 791. 
342 [d. at 791. 
343 [d. at 792. 
344 [d. 
346 See id. 
346 See id.; Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United 8tates Atomic Energy Comm'n, 
449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
347 See 136 CONGo REC. 88369, 88369 (daily ed. June 20, 1990). 
348 See Bolduan, supra note 16, at 372; see also Peter Borrelli, Timber!, 41 AMICUS J. 41, 
41 (1990). 
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Contrary to Senator Hatfield's fears,349 judicial review does not 
threaten Congress's reliance on agency expertise, because the role 
of the courts is not to override agency decisionmaking or to impose 
the views of others onto a particular agency.350 Courts are not in a 
position to second-guess decisions made in the normal course of 
events as long as agency decisions follow mandated procedures. 351 
The duty of courts is to step in only when an agency has overstepped 
its statutory bounds,352 or when its actions are determined to be 
"arbitrary and capricious."353 For instance, the BLM is free to ex-
ercise its expertise in the area of forest management as long as it 
abides by the procedures and policies established by Congress.354 
Once the BLM has failed to work within the boundaries set by 
Congress, the courts have a duty to step in and insure that congres-
sional policy is imposed on the agency. 355 
The need for regulatory standards presumes that there is a power 
outside of an agency that, if necessary, can determine whether a 
given decision is within the scope of an agency's delegated power. 356 
Without the ever present potential for review, standards for agency 
action have no purpose and no force. Emasculating the standards by 
which agencies operate, even if those standards are minimal, invites 
administrators to act with unlimited discretion, leaving decisions 
with national import solely in the hands of an individual and his or 
her personal biases and prejudices. 357 
Statutorily mandated agency standards are important because 
they often protect public policies that Congress has deemed impor-
349 See Bolduan, supra note 16, at 371-72; see also 136 CONGo REC. 88369, S8369 (daily ed. 
June 20, 1990). 
350 See Portland Audubon Soc'y V. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1484-85 (D. Or. 1989) "A trial 
court should give deference to agency expertise when considering factual issues and matters 
involving the exercise of judgement." Id. at 1484; see also Bolduan, supra note 16, at 372-74. 
351 See Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1118; see also Yakus V. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 
(1944). 
352 See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425; Creppel V. United States Corps of Eng'r, 500 F. Supp. 
1108, 1115 (E.D. La. 1980); Peoples V. United States Dep't of Agric., 427 F.2d 561, 566 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970). ' 
353 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976); see, e.g., Grace Towers Tenants Ass'n V. Grace Housing Dev. 
Fund, 538 F.2d 491, 494 (2d Cir. 1976). 
354 See Lujan, 712 F. Supp. at 1484-85. 
355 See id. at 1484; see also Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426. 
356 See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425; see also Bolduan, supra note 16, at 373. 
357 See Ralpho V. Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (unreviewability gives adminis-
trator in question ability to ignore statutory requirements); see also Bowen V. Michigan 
Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 670, 671 (1986). 
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tanto For example, NEPA's requirement that all federal agencies 
complete an EIS prior to undertaking any major action protects the 
the nation's concern for environmental preservation.358 Without the 
possibility of independent judicial review, agencies would be free to 
ignore this congressional commitment to the environment.359 The 
judicial process has become one of the only means to ensure that an 
agency has obeyed NEPA and fully respected the environmental 
concerns at issue. 360 
B. The Hatfield Riders Do Not Express True Congressional Intent 
The Hatfield riders are an example of the threat to environmental 
concerns that the removal of judicial review of agency actions 
poses. 36! These riders sanctioned agency behavior that the United 
States District Court for the District of Oregon found in Portland 
Audubon Society was likely to lead to the ultimate extinction of an 
endangered species. 362 Seattle Audubon Society was an important 
initial step toward fighting the evils threatened by Senator Hatfield's 
riders.363 In its effort not to encroach on congressional authority, 
however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
pointed out a way in which Congress could have mandated the same 
result without violating the separation of powers.364 The court in 
effect acknowledged the limited value of its own holding. 365 As a 
result, the separation of powers doctrine as applied in Seattle Au-
358 See supra notes 329--34 and accompanying text. 
359 See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 
F.2d 1109, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971); see also Ralpho, 569 F.2d at 617. 
360 Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1111; Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir. 1971). 
Despite the importance of the interests at stake, Congress is well within its rights to deny 
judicial redress when an agency has ignored these environmental values, because the consti-
tution has not been implicated. Ralpho, 569 F.2d at 622. "That Congress has imposed strictures 
does not, of course, prevent it from shielding even the most patent deviation from the statutory 
scheme from judicial redress where the Constitution is in no wise implicated." Id.; see supra 
notes 119-21. 
361 See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1485 (D. Or.), aff'd in part, 
884 F.2d 1233, 1240 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470 (1989); Portland Audubon Soc'y 
v. Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210, 21,211 (D. Or. 1988), re'YIWnded, 866 
F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1989); see also City of Tenakee Springs v. Clough, 915 F.2d 1308, 1314 
(9th Cir. 1990) (rider potentially prevented judicial review of proposed action that would have 
caused irreversible damage to Alaska's old-growth forest). 
362 See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210, 21,211 
(D. Or. 1988), re'YIWnded, 866 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1989). 
363 See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. 
364 See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text. 
366 See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text. 
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dubon Society is of too limited a nature to be a long-term solution 
to the problems that these riders and their predecessors present. 
Although courts have upheld Senator Hatfield's riders out of de-
ference to Congress,366 they could invalidate these riders without 
restricting Congress's power to deny judicial review. Because the 
riders were part of appropriations bills and therefore were not sub-
ject to the congressional scrutiny that is required for substantive 
legislation under the rules of both houses, they arguably did not 
represent true congressional intent. 367 
Appropriations bills are not subject to the public or committee 
scrutiny to which substantive legislation is subject.368 With regard 
to the Hatfield riders, the committees that have jurisdiction over 
the BLM and the USFS did not debate the content or the effect of 
the riders.369 In fact, due to congressional deference to the Commit-
tee on Appropriations in the area of appropriations legislation, the 
bulk of the members of both houses may have been unaware of the 
contents of the appropriations bills containing the riders.370 Thus, 
these bills were the product not of the democratic process, but rather 
of one representative's policy choice: a choice heavily influenced by 
the timber industry. 371 
A court must find clear and convincing evidence of congressional 
intent to remove judicial review before it will interpret a statute as 
expressing such a mandate.372 Because the Hatfield riders have not 
been ratified according to proper congressional procedure, it is ar-
guable that no court should find them to voice a true congressional 
intent to remove judicial review. 373 This argument forms the under-
lying premise of the Supreme Court's contention that the intent of 
the sponsors of the legislation does not necessarily represent the 
intent of the Congress as a whole. 374 The Supreme Court in Tennes-
see Valley Authority expressly found that the comments of a few 
members of the Committee on Appropriations, in an appropriations 
bill, did not amount to an expression of congressional intent. 375 
366 See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. 
367 See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text. 
368 See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text. 
369 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text; see also ERODING, supra note 2, at 57. 
370 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
371 See Bolduan, S1tpra note 16, at 369-71; see also Borrelli, supra note 348, at 4l. 
372 See Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see supra notes 134-38 and 
accompanying text. 
373 See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text. 
374 See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text. 
376 Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 191-92 (1978). 
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A judicial finding that a rider to an appropriations bill embodies 
true congressional intent becomes even less credible when NEP A-
a statute that underwent complete congressional scrutiny-man-
dates review under the circumstances found to exist. 376 In the 1990 
rider, Senator Hatfield expressly ignored the requirements of stat-
utes, such as NEP A, that properly had gained congressional sanc-
tion. 377 Traditionally, Congress has been able to effect this kind of 
exception only through actual repeal or modification of the implicated 
statutes. 378 The Supreme Court has found that an appropriations bill 
cannot express sufficient congressional intent to repeal substantive 
legislation. 379 
C. The Hatfield Riders Violate Congressional Rules of Procedure 
The rules of procedure for both the House of Representatives and 
the Senate prohibit the inclusion of any new or general legislation 
in appropriations bills. 380 By denying judicial review of agency activ-
ity through his riders, Senator Hatfield was not appropriating funds 
to implement substantive legislation. 381 Rather, he was exempting 
certain agencies from their statutory duties and, by doing so, effec-
tively repealing federal laws that did not comport with his view of 
forest management. 382 Hatfield's riders unquestionably violate the 
congressional rules forbidding substantive legislation in appropria-
tions bills. 383 
The use of appropriations bills to pass substantive legislation is 
not a minor infraction of Congress's procedural rules. 384 Because the 
members of Congress rely on the fact that appropriations bills con-
tain only appropriations, neither concerned individual members nor 
interested committees reviewed or debated the effects of Senator 
Hatfield's riders on the future of the old-gro·wth forests. 385 Thus, the 
376 See id. 
377 See id. at 190-91; see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
378 See Tennessee Valley, 437 U.S. at 190; Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 
1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990). 
379 Tennessee Valley, 437 U.S. at 190-91. 
380 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
381 See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text. 
382 See Bolduan, supra note 16, at 369-71; see also supra notes 26-27, 40-43 and accom-
panying text. 
383 See supra note 47 and accompanying text; see also Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 
914 F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990); Bolduan, supra note 16, at 371. 
384 See Bolduan, supra note 16, at 371. 
386 See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. 
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riders violated not only the rules of Congress but the very demo-
cratic spirit that is the essence of representative government. 
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Ballin, courts have enforced 
congressional rules of procedure even when such enforcement has 
resulted in the overruling of an act of Congress. 386 In determining 
whether Congress has acted pursuant to its own rules, the courts 
do not look at the frequency of a legislative practice but at the 
mandates of the particular rule of procedure that should apply. 387 
The fact that the rule forbidding substantive legislation in appropri-
ations bills is followed more in the breach than the observance is no 
defense. 388 The regularity with which Congress breaks this rule calls 
for swift action on the part of the courts, rather than judicial inaction. 
As the practice stands, individual legislators are dictating or at least 
directing national policy. 
Under current precedents, there are no strong policies that should 
move a court to decline to review the Hatfield riders.389 To date, no 
member of either house has come before the court asking that the 
riders be invalidated. The individuals who challenged the validity of 
the riders, unlike members of Congress, have no other forum in 
which to redress their grievances except the court. 390 
In sum, the courts have reason to overrule the Hatfield riders on 
the grounds that they were passed in violation of congressional rules 
of procedure. The riders illustrate a serious threat to environmental 
preservation that cannot be ignored. Powerful economic interests 
and the legislators and administrators over whom they hold sway 
pose a powerful threat to this nation's attempt at preserving the 
environment for the future. 391 In order to prevent single-issue poli-
ticians from destroying the environment, the courts must provide 
more substantive protections to environmental interests. The only 
way to achieve this goal may be through the Constitution. 
386 See supra notes 82-98 and accompanying text. No court has invalidated a piece of 
general legislation passed in violation of congressional rules. See supra notes 83-115. The 
Supreme Court indicated in Ballin, however, that it would have nullified the statute at issue 
if Congress had passed the statute in violation of congressional rules. See United States v. 
Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1892). 
387 See Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1949). 
3B8 See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 171 (1978); Seattle Audubon 
Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 
884 F.2d 1233, 1234, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1470 (1989). 
389 See supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text. 
390 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text. 
391 See Borelli, supra note 348, at 41; Bolduan, supra note 16, at 369. 
1991] HATFIELD RIDERS 473 
D. A Constitutionally Protected Interest in 
Environmental Preservation is Necessary to Protect Dwindling 
National Resources 
Although courts have recognized the possibility of a constitution-
ally protected right to environmental preservation, no court specif-
ically has found that right to exist. One court has suggested that 
courts may find such a right, through the exercise of interpretive 
license, in the penumbras of the Ninth Amendment. 392 Most courts, 
however, probably would view this broadening of the concept of 
fundamental constitutional rights as judicial overreaching.393 In ad-
dition, the creation of such a right no doubt would lead to litigation 
touching every government activity. This flood of litigation could be 
extremely detrimental to the effective performance of the govern-
ment in all areas, including environmental protection. The need for 
environmental protection is great, but such a broadening of the 
concept of fundamental rights is not a realistic or practical solution. 
A more reasonable analysis would find procedural due process 
protection for environmental concerns in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. An entitlement394 to environmental protec-
tion, as compared to a fundamental right to environmental protec-
tion, would be more limited in scope simply because the statutory 
provisions that created the entitlement would limit it.395 For exam-
ple, an entitlement under NEP A would come into play only when 
the federal government plans a major action. In addition, procedural 
due process, because it is a flexible standard, can be satisfied in ways 
that would be less restrictive to governmental operations than would 
the enforcement of a substantive right. 396 
Although procedural due process protection for environmental in-
terests is more reasonable than substantive due process protection, 
the feasibility of creating such protection is of no less a concern. 
NEPA seems to establish a protectable interest or entitlement on 
behalf of the general public when it requires governmental agencies 
to consider the environmental impacts of their activities.397 NEPA 
392 See Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (N.D. W.Va. 1973). 
393 See Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1435 (5th Cir. 1990); Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium 
& Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 721-22 (E.D. La. 1976). 
394 See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text. 
3.. See supra notes 250-65 and accompanying text. 
396 See supra notes 255-63 and accompanying text. 
397 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). 
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can only create an entitlement, however, if it has some substantive 
policy that creates an obligation on the part of an agency.398 Although 
NEP A's primary focus seems procedural, it does establish substan-
tive policies that are merely safeguarded by its mandatory proce-
dures.399 These substantive policies are no less substantive because 
they are inextricably bound with the procedures necessary to enforce 
them.4°O Under NEPA, an agency's duty to evaluate the environ-
mental impact of each federal action remains even when the agency 
cannot comply with the specific terms of its procedures because of a 
statutory conflict. 401 It establishes that the government will use all 
the means at its disposal to protect environmental values,402 prom-
ising the public the benefit of existing and future natural resources. 403 
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia, in order for a statute to create a protectable interest, 
the regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute must provide 
that, upon the occurrence of certain specific circumstances, a partic-
ular outcome must follow. 404 The applicability of NEPA's procedures, 
such as the filing of an EIS, are predicated on the existence of a 
major federal action. 405 In other words, NEPA's mandates come into 
play only after the occurrence of a specific event: the proposal of a 
major federal action. 
Like other statutes that have created a protectable interest, NE-
PA's restrictions on agency behavior are mandatory and leave no 
room for agency discretion. 406 Congress expressed the only possibil-
ity of agency leeway in the qualifying statement that each agency 
must consider environmental values in its decisionmaking "to the 
extent possible."407 This statement, however, goes to the quality of 
the action-in that the agency's ability to fulfill its statutory obli-
gation may limit the extent of its consideration of environmental 
preservation-rather than to the possibility of inaction.408 NEP A 
398 See supra notes 238-49 and accompanying text. 
399 See supra notes 324-28 and accompanying text. 
400 See supra notes 329-85 and accompanying text; see also Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating 
Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
401 See supra notes 336-45. 
402 See Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1112, 1114. 
403 See id. at 1112; see also 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1988). 
404 See Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 904 F.2d 719, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
405 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). 
406 See supra notes 329-85 and accompanying text. 
407 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). 
408 See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 
F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971). "We must stress as forcefully as possible that this language 
does not provide an escape hatch for footdragging agencies; it does not make NEPA's proce-
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makes environmental preservation the responsibility of every federal 
agency, because agencies are not permitted but "compelled" to take 
environmental values into account in their decisionmaking. 409 
The restrictions that NEP A imposes on governmental agencies 
give rise to a legitimate public expectation that no agency will im-
plement a major federal action without carefully considering its en-
vironmental impacts in an effort to preserve environmental re-
sources. 410 If an agency were to neglect its duties under NEPA, the 
public would have an objectively justifiable claim against that 
agency.411 Arguably, then, NEP A entitles the public to actions con-
sistent with the preservation of natural resource·s. 
The possibility of such an entitlement is complicated by two as-
pects of current doctrine. First, for purposes of the Fifth Amend-
ment, could such a right be deemed a property or liberty interest? 
Second, who could claim due process protection if such a right exists? 
Under Bi-Metallic, when a significant number of individuals allege 
that a government action has denied some protected interest, prac-
ticability constrains the application of due process protections. 412 
First, what is the nature of the interest that NEP A creates? A 
statute can create either a property or a liberty interest, as long as 
the statute creates more than a unilateral expectation. 413 NEP A 
places a nondiscretionary duty on federal agencies to protect envi-
ronmental values. 414 In the past, when courts discussed the possi-
bility of a constitutional right to environmental preservation, they 
viewed the proposed right in terms of a liberty interest.415 The 
constitutional concept of liberty may be broad enough to encompass 
preservation of the environment on which all lives and freedoms 
depend. 416 In time, our environment may become a privilege essen-
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness. 417 Courts also may view the 
public's interest in environmental preservation as a property inter-
dural requirements somehow 'discretionary.' Congress did not intend the Act to be such a 
paper tiger." [d. 
409 [d. at 1112. 
410 See Calvert Cliffs', 449 F.2d at 1118, 1128. 
411 See id.; see supra notes 214-18, 238-49 and accompanying text. 
412 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
413 See supra notes 214-18, 238-49 and accompanying text. 
414 See supra notes 321-35 and accompanying text. 
415 MacNamara v. County Council of Sussex County, 738 F. Supp. 134, 141-42 (D. Del. 
1990); Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716,718 (E.D. La. 1976). 
416 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Nicoletti v. Brown, 740 F. 
Supp. 1268, 1281 (N.D. Ohio 1987). 
417 See Nicoletti, 740 F. Supp. at 1282; Norse, supra note 1, at 42. 
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est. If public lands such as national forests are to be held for the use 
and benefit of the public,418 then the public has a genuine interest in 
that property. 
Environmental protection may not fall easily into either of these 
constitutionally prescribed categories, but it does contain elements 
essential to both. Although environmental preservation may be a 
novel liberty interest, the environmental crisis that exists in the 
world today calls for novel approaches. 419 The flexibility of these 
constitutional concepts can open the doors of possibility to a con-
cerned court. 
Although the public's interest in environmental preservation may 
be either a property or a liberty interest, this is not sufficient to 
garner it due process protection. A protectable liberty or property 
interest ordinarily must be one that is a personal interest belonging 
to an individual. 420 The interest in environmental preservation is not 
an interest that accrues to an individual per se, but to society in 
general. 421 On its face, this right by its very nature appears too 
expansive. 422 
Unlike the tax laws in Bi-Metallic, however, any agency action 
that denies the interest created by NEP A does not affect all persons 
equally.423 Because each agency action is limited to a specific region 
and often a specific site, the repercussions of that government activ-
ity on the environment will affect certain individuals more seriously 
than others. This piecemeal taking of rights is more akin to the 
situation in Londoner. 424 
Here, as in Londoner, the legislature has delegated the task of 
determining whether citizens' concerns in a certain situation will be 
respected. 425 Each agency determines on a project-by-project basis 
whether to follow the mandates of NEPA.426 Surely those persons 
directly affected by an isolated agency action should have the right 
418 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 552 (1823). 
419 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
420 See supra notes 272-76 and accompanying text. 
421 See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1988). 
422 See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). As the 
Supreme Court noted in Sierra Club v. Morton, "[alesthetic and environmental well-being, 
like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and 
the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few 
does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process." 405 U.S. 
727, 735 (1972). 
423 See Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S. at 445. 
424 See 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908). 
425 See supra notes 278-81 and accompanying text. 
426 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1988). 
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to object to that action, as did the taxpayers in Londoner.427 Current 
judicial policies already help to identify those individuals most di-
rectly affected by governmental actions. 428 For example, some courts 
limit standing under environmental statutes such as NEP A by allow-
ing standing only to those plaintiffs who "by their activities or con-
duct" have demonstrated a special interest in environmental protec-
tion.429 In other words, the protection of the right created by NEP A 
would not require that every individual, no matter how remotely 
affected, be heard. 430 
The nature and extent of the process that is necessary to protect 
NEP A's entitlement can be determined through application of the 
Mathews test. 431 The importance of the interest affected by official 
action is clearly demonstrable-without a balancing between envi-
ronmental and economic interests in agency decisionmaking, the 
destruction of our environment is all but assured. In addition, the 
risk that agencies will ignore environmental concerns without any 
check on their decisionmaking is considerable, as was aptly demon-
strated by the BLM's refusal to incorporate new information re-
garding the spotted owl into its EIS.432 This BLM plan alone could 
result directly in the extinction of the spotted owl, an irreplaceable 
environmental resource. 433 
Claims that an agency has failed to comply with NEP A are pre-
sumptively reviewable under both NEPA and APA.434 A right to 
procedural due process under NEP A will ensure the preservation of 
some opportunity for affected parties to be heard, whether it be in 
the form of a formal hearing or an administrative review process. 435 
As a matter of policy, one might wonder whether judicial recog-
nition of this entitlement contravenes the practical needs of the 
government.436 One must recognize that Congress created the man-
datory requirements of NEP A. Protecting the entitlement to envi-
ronmental preservation that NEPA creates with proper due process 
merely will insure that the will of Congress, not just the dictates of 
427 See Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385 (1908). 
428 See Citizens Comm. for Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1970). 
429 Id. at 103. 
430 See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). 
431 See supra notes 266-71 and accompanying text. 
432 See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. 
433 Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210, 21,211 
(D. Or. 1988). 
434 See supra notes 149-63 and accompanying text. 
435 See supra notes 251-64 and accompanying text. 
436 See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
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certain congresspersons, are carried out to the fullest extent possi-
ble. 437 Senator Hatfield's reasons for precluding judicial review stem 
from his belief that environmental groups have been abusing the 
court system and preventing the implementation of valid BLM pol-
icy.438 The environmentalists' actions, according to Senator Hatfield, 
serve only to disrupt the economy in areas dependent upon the 
timber industry.439 His argument does not consider that, without 
environmental preservation, the timber industry eventually will 
come to a halt as the natural resources on which it depends disap-
pear. 440 
Perhaps a more sound economic policy would entail finding alter-
native means of supporting the economies of those areas now depen-
dent upon the timber industry.441 Although the government's concern 
for economic stability is important, the government has alternative 
means of reaching that end. 442 In contrast, there are no viable alter-
natives to the preservation of nonrenewable natural resources-once 
they are gone, they are gone forever. 443 In NEPA, Congress ex-
plicitly recognized the profound effect that humanity has on the 
environment, and the critical need to restore and preserve environ-
mental quality for the generations to come.444 The interests of the 
government cannot tip the scale against invaluable environmental 
interests. 
The notion of a constitutionally protected right to natural re-
sources is not a shocking new proposition. 445 As early as 1973, federal 
courts had anticipated the possibility of a constitutionally generated 
right to environmental protection. 446 Although the creation of such 
a protected interest may seem to stretch the bounds of the Fifth 
Amendment,447 the current devastation of the environment and the 
need for preservation calls for drastic measures.448 "Must our law be 
437 See supra notes 26-27, 74-75 and accompanying text. 
438 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
439 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
«0 See Norse, supra note 1, at 43-44; Stiak, supra note 3, at 39. 
441 See Norse, supra note 1, at 43-44; 136 CONGo REC. S8371, S8372 (daily ed. June 20, 
1990). 
442 136 CONGo REC. S8371, S8372 (daily ed. June 20, 1990). 
443 See Stiak, supra note 3, at 39. 
444 See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1988). 
445 See supra notes 288-99 and accompanying text. 
446 See Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1064 (1973). 
447 See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1098 (7th Cir. 1990); MacNamara v. County Council 
of Sussex County, 738 F. Supp. 134, 142 (D. Del. 1990); Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & 
Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 721 (E.D. La. 1976). 
448 See Norse, supra note 1, at 43-44; Stiak, supra note 3, at 39. 
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so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible that we render 
ourselves helpless when the existing methods and the traditional 
concepts do not quite fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate 
for new issues?"449 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Over the past twenty years, the public's interest in protecting the 
environment and natural resources has grown almost as quickly as 
has our ability to destroy it. As the United States's population 
grows, so does its perceived need to exploit the environment. In 
reaction to these events, the federal government has enacted legis-
lation such as NEP A, which calls for the balancing of the competing 
interests of economic growth and environmental preservation in gov-
ernment decisionmaking. Despite the laudable attempts of legisla-
tors to preserve the environment, we are losing ground in the battle 
to preserve the environment daily. The harvesting of the old-growth 
forests of Oregon and Washington, which is at the center of the 
present controversy, is evidence of our loss. At the current rate of 
timber harvest, all but a very small percentage of the ancient forests 
will be eliminated in our lifetime. 
Because of the ever growing importance of environmental con-
cerns, we must be assured that the government will abide by its 
own rules of conduct in its day-to-day decisionmaking. Often the only 
means of monitoring the conduct of government agencies is through 
the courts. If that key part of our system of checks and balances is 
lost, especially in the area of environmental rights, we may be 
denying a habitable world to ourselves and our children. 
By drafting and enacting his riders, Senator Hatfield officially has 
put the people and the courts of the United States on notice. If the 
courts do not take action to ensure that our rights in the environment 
will be protected against influential economic interests, we will have 
nothing left to protect. 
449 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 755 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
